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I. INTRODUCTION
The last decade has seen an explosion of employment discrimination class action
lawsuits that have been resolved through record-breaking settlements. The best known of these
cases is the $176 million settlement involving Texaco, a settlement that came on the heels of the
much publicized discovery of tape-recorded meetings that seemed to indicate the use of explicit
racial epithets by management level employees.1 There have also been substantial settlements
involving Coca-Cola ($192 million), Home Depot ($104 million), Shoney’s ($105 million),
Publix Markets ($81 million), and State Farm Insurance Co. ($157 million).2 A recently filed
sex discrimination suit against Wal-Mart appears poised to set a new record.3
Despite the proliferation of these high-profile cases, we know surprisingly little
about their effects on either the firms that have been sued or the plaintiff classes. For example,
we do not know whether the lawsuits produce substantial benefits to the plaintiff class, prompt a
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presented at faculty workshops at George Washington University Law School and William and Mary Law
School where I received many helpful comments from the participants. I am also grateful for comments on
earlier drafts from Ian Ayres, Bill Bratton, Charlie Craver, Mitu Gulati, Larry Mitchell, Molly McUsic,
Naomi Cahn, Stewart Schwab and Jonathan Walker. I have also benefitted from the work of a number of
research assistants, in particular Phoebe Papageorgiou who assisted with the statistical portion of this study,
as well as the research o f Juan Ca rlos Flam mand , Adrienn e Rosen and Patti So h.
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change in corporate culture, or exact costs that are likely to serve as an adequate deterrent
against discrimination. Because all of the large cases have been resolved through settlements
rather than trials, we also do not know whether the cases involve provable claims of
discrimination. In this article, I will seek to add to our knowledge by analyzing the effect these
large class action lawsuits have on firms and plaintiffs. The first part of the article involves an
empirical analysis designed to assess whether the lawsuits, or their settlements affect shareholder
value as measured by their effect on the stock prices.4 In the second part of the article, I will
present three case studies of lawsuits involving Texaco, Home Depot and Dennys to explore
whether the lawsuits produce substantial changes within the corporations or provide meaningful
benefits to the plaintiff class.5
This study challenges many of the prevailing views on employment
discrimination class action litigation. The statistical study demonstrates that the lawsuits, neither
in their filing nor settlements, substantially affects stock prices, and when there is an effect it
tends to be short-lived. Yet, although the lawsuits do not result in significant financial losses to
shareholder value, managers often take them seriously – more seriously than the financial
impact of the suits typically justify. Stated somewhat differently, while investors do not appear
to be significantly interested in the lawsuits, managers frequently are. Taking the lawsuits
seriously, however, does not mean that the managers implement meaningful reform; on the
contrary, I will suggest that the settlements frequently produce little to no substantive change
within the corporations and whatever changes are implemented tend to be cosmetic in nature and
primarily designed to address public relations problems. As demonstrated in the case studies,
many companies, such as Texaco and Home Depot, fail to enact meaningful changes in their
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employment practices and the monetary recoveries constitute the sole direct benefit the lawsuits
provide to the plaintiff class.
When divided by the size of the class, these benefits tend to be relatively modest,
averaging about $10,000 per class member, or well below what a plaintiff could expect to
recover in a successful individual suit.6 Moreover, given the size of the defendant corporations,
the damages also fail to pose a significant deterrent threat to firms. To give but one example, the
record-setting settlement involving Coca-Cola amounted to less than 0.15% of the firm’s
capitalization.7 Although the damage amounts are often insufficient to compensate plaintiffs or
deter defendants, other parties involved in the litigation fare significantly better. Attorneys are
routinely receiving fee awards that are four to six times their actual fees, and a host of groups
loosely tied to the diversity industry are likewise collecting a disproportionate share of the
settlement funds through diversity training, purchases from minority suppliers, and contributions
to various minority groups either as part of the settlement or to repair public relations damage.8

The limited effect the suits have on stock prices also provides an empirical
challenge to the ability of markets to eliminate discrimination. Gary Becker hypothesized long
ago that firms that engaged in employment discrimination would ultimately be driven out of the
market because of their inefficient discriminatory tastes.9 But if lawsuits alleging
discrimination, settlements of those suits, or the remedial changes that follow the settlement do
6

The ben efits provid ed to the p laintiffs are disc ussed in se ction IV.A , infra. In a prev ious study , I
docum ented tha t discrimin ation settlem ents obtain ed by th e Equa l Emplo ymen t Oppo rtunity Co mmiss ion in
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7
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not affect firm value, then it is difficult to see how the market would provide an adequate
deterrent to discrimination. Both the aggregate data and the case studies suggest that there is no
reason to expect the market to punish firms because of their discriminatory employment
practices.
These findings reflect a substantial shift in the nature of employment
discrimination litigation, and in discrimination itself. Not so long ago, class action employment
discrimination suits were defined as a quintessential form of public law litigation where
monetary relief was generally viewed as far less important than the institutional reform the suit
ultimately produced.10 Yet, today the lawsuits have largely become just another variation of a
tort claim where monetary relief is the principal, and often the sole, goal of the litigation. Along
with this shift in emphasis has come a dramatic change in our perspective on the persistence of
discrimination, as there is no longer any concerted effort to eliminate discrimination, but instead
efforts are directed at providing monetary compensation for past discrimination without
particular concern for preventing future discrimination or even remedying past discrimination
through injunctive relief. For firms, discrimination claims are now like accidents – a cost of
doing business, which necessarily implies that a certain level of discrimination will persist.
One reason for the change in the nature of the litigation is that employment
discrimination class actions have evolved into a purely private realm with little to no government
oversight – indeed, I will suggest with little oversight of any kind. With some exceptions, most
courts never become involved in fashioning an appropriate remedy or overseeing the
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In his seminal article on public law litigation, Professor Abram Chayes identified employment
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5

implementation of the consent decree, so enforcement is largely left to private plaintiffs’
attorneys, or their recent offshoots, Diversity Task Forces, neither of which has a sufficient
interest in the ongoing proceedings to ensure change actually occurs.11
This study will contain two distinct but related parts. The first part involves an
empirical study of the effect class action employment discrimination lawsuits have on firms.
This part of the study relies on an event study’s technique, a statistical methodology that seeks to
measure the effect of a particular event, in this case the filing and settlement of class action
litigation, on firm value. The event studies model has been widely used to assess the impact of
litigation in previous studies.12 The second part of this study will involve three case studies to
see how firms react to class action litigation. The three case studies involve three distinct
responses to class action litigation by Texaco, Home Depot and Denny’s, and I will suggest that
each provides a model response under particular circumstances, models that I label public
relations (Texaco), recalcitrance (Home Depot), and reform (Denny’s). In the last part of the
article, I will offer some suggestions for reform, including increased monetary damages for the
plaintiffs and monitoring for the settlement, so as to restore the original public purpose to the
litigation. At the same time, this article will be largely descriptive in nature with a primary
intent of analyzing the nature of class action employment discrimination today.
II. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
If the filing or settling of class action discrimination lawsuits adversely affects
defendant firms, we would expect that effect to be reflected in lower stock prices. To measure
that effect, this part of the article relies on what is known as an event study, a methodology that
has been widely used in economics and finance to measure the impact of specific events on firm
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value.13 An event study is a statistical technique designed to isolate the impact of an event on a
firm’s stock price, and, as described in more detail below, it does so by measuring the stock’s
return after the event is announced against the return that would have been expected had the
event not occurred.14 In this way, it is possible to determine what effect, if any, the particular
event had on the stock price. The methodology of the study will be explained further following a
discussion of the underlying hypothesis and the data on which the study is based.
A. The Hypothesis.
This study measures the effect the filing of a class action lawsuit and its
settlement have on a firm’s stock price, with the expectation that either event will negatively
affect the stock price. The filing of a class action discrimination suit against a corporation
presents the possibility that the firm will experience significant costs from the suit, either from
the money the firm may pay to resolve the suit, or be ordered to pay following a trial. In
addition to the financial cost, firms may also experience reputational costs from being identified
as a firm that discriminates. This will be particularly true if the lawsuit generates national news,
as is true for all of the cases analyzed here. Predicting that the filing of suit will adversely affect
stock prices is consistent with many prior studies examining the effect of various kinds of
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See, e.g., Sanjai Bh agat, et al., The Costs of Inefficient Bargaining and Financial Distress: Evidence
from Co rporate L awsuits , 35 J. OF F INANCIAL E C O N . 221 (19 94) (ana lyzing the effect of inte rfirm law suits
on the v alue of co rporate litiga nts); Sanjai B hagat, et al., The Sh arehold er Wea lth Implica tions of Co rporate
Lawsu its, 27 FINANCIAL M G T . 5 (1998) (analyzing the effect of filings and settlements on corporations);
John M . Bizjak & Jeffrey L . Coles, The Effect of Private Antitrust Litigation on the Stock-Market Valuation
of the Firm , 85 A MER . E C O N . R V W . 436 (19 95); Joni H ersch, Equal Em ployment O pportunity and Firm
Profitability , 26 J. OF H U M A N R ESOURCES 140 (1990) (mea suring effect of discrimination lawsuits);
Micha el I. Muo ghalu, et al., Hazardous Waste Lawsuits, Shareholder Returns, and Deterrence, 57
S O U T H E R N E C O N . J. 357 (19 90); Da vid Princ e & Pau l Rubin, The Effects of Product Liability Litigation on
the Value of Firms, 4 A MER . L A W A N D E C O N . J. 44 (2002); W. Kip Viscusi & Joni Her sch, The Market
Response to Product Safety Litigation, 2 J. OF R E G U L A T O RY E C O N . 215 (1990) (assessing impact of product
safety litigation on firm value).
14
For an overview of event study methodology see J O H N Y. C AMPBELL , T HE E CONOMETRICS OF F I N A N C IA L
M ARKETS 149-18 0 (1997 ); A. Craig MacK inlay, Event Studies in Economics and Finance, 36 J. OF E C O N .
L IT . 13 (1997).
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lawsuits — product liability, securities and discrimination — on stock prices, most of which
have found that the lawsuits result in a loss of shareholder value.15
Settlements should also negatively affect stock prices, particularly if the value of
the settlement is higher than what the market was expecting. Here again, the financial costs are
not the only costs the lawsuits can exact from firms. Employment discrimination settlements
often require changes in institutional practices, and they may also require firms to engage in
some form of what might be labeled affirmative action by requiring that members of the affected
class receive employment preferences.16 Even if the settlement does not require affirmative
action, the perception may be just as important as the reality, as investors may believe that the
firm will be required to engage in affirmative action and may also view affirmative action as
inconsistent with efficient employment practices. All of these factors should lead to a decrease
in the stock price based on the settlement of the lawsuit,17 and this study is designed to test these
hypotheses.
B. The Data.
This study involves class action employment discrimination lawsuits filed or
settled between November 1991 through August 2001 in which the defendants were corporations
that were publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange. The beginning date of the time
15

See, e.g., Bhaga t et al., supra note 13, at 6 (“We find that no matter who brings a lawsuit against a firm .
. . defendants experience economically meaningful and statistically significant wealth losses upon the filing
of the suit.”); Bizjak & C oles, supra note 13, at 437 (filings of private antitrust suits result in a wealth loss
for defendants of 0.6% of the firm’s equity value . . .); Joni Hersch, supra note 13, at 150 (finding
significant negative effect for class action filings).
16
See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (requiring one-to-one promotions for members of
class to remedy past discrimination); Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421
(1986) (permitting remedial race-conscious relief).
17
There are two ways in which the stock price might increase based on the settlement. The price may
increase to the extent the settlement is lower than the market was expecting, and some studies have found
such an effect that m itigates the initial d rop in the stock price at the time o f filing. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat
et al., The Co sts of Inefficient B argainin g and F inancia l Distress: Ev idence fro m Corp orate La wsuits, 35 J.
OF F INANCIAL E C O N . 221, 245 (1994) (finding that “the loss attributed to the filing was often regained upon
settlement . . .”). This effect is generally dependent on an initial wealth loss attributable to the filing, and
would be captured in the current study. Additionally, as noted below, it is conceivable that the stock price
would increase if the settlement were seen as a sign that inefficient employment practices would be
eliminate d.
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frame was selected to coincide with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which made
damages available for the first time to plaintiffs who successfully sued under Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act.18 Prior to the passage of the Act, plaintiffs were limited to equitable
relief, typically back pay which rarely offered the prospect of substantial damages.19 The
availability of damages significantly increased the cost of discrimination and likewise produced
a sharp increase in class action litigation.20
The study focuses on class action lawsuits rather than individual lawsuits because,
with few exceptions, only class action litigation raises the threat of costs that would be
substantial enough to interest an investor or to deter firms. Even after the passage of the 1991
Act, most individual cases are resolved for under $25,000,21 and given the sheer volume of
individual cases, it is not reasonable to expect investors to react to each case that receives some
publicity. Class action lawsuits, on the other hand, have the potential to cost the firm millions of
dollars, as well as to generate adverse publicity, and the initial uncertainty regarding their
potential monetary impact provides the kind of information that should be of interest to
investors. Additionally, class action lawsuits remain relatively rare. Approximately seventyfive employment discrimination lawsuits that include class action allegations are filed in any
given year, compared to the approximately twenty-thousand individual cases.22 The scarcity of
class action lawsuits means that such suits should send a potent signal to interested parties,
particularly when the potential size of the award is taken into account.
18

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.
See Albemarle Paper Co. v. M oody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (discussing remedial objectives of Title VII).
20
See David S egal, Lawyers Stak e a Claim on Bias Lawsuits: W ith More Case s in Litigation, Firms Ca sh
In on Billable-H our Bona nza, W ASH . P OST , Jan. 27, 1997, at A1 (discussing impact Civil Rights Act of
1991 h ad on cla ss action litigatio n).
21
This figur e is based o n settleme nts obtaine d by the EEO C. See Selmi, supra note 6, at 1432-33. For
cases that are resolved at trial, the awards tend to be substantially higher, particularly for private plaintiffs
where th e media n award betwee n 1992 -95 wa s $91,00 0. Id. at 1434. It is important to note, however, that
only ab out 8% of the case s are resolv ed throu gh a trial. Id.
22
Based o n figures c ompile d by the Adm inistrative O ffice of the C ourts, 70 e mploy ment cla ss action suits
were filed in 1997 , 85 in 19 98 and 74 in 19 99. See Admin istrative Office of the Cou rts, Judicial Business
of the Co urts, Ann ual Repo rts for 199 7, 1998 , 1999, tab les X-5.
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Since the statistical part of this study focuses on the reaction of investors, the data
include class action lawsuits that were reported in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal,
the Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times. These four newspapers were selected because
of their national scope, which makes it reasonable to assume that information published in these
papers would reach investors in one way or another, either directly through the newspapers
themselves or through wire or news services affiliated with the newspapers.23 Because the
sample includes only those cases that were reported in the national press, it likely overrepresents
large noteworthy cases, while overlooking smaller and less publicized cases. By the same
measure, the cases included in this study should have the greatest potential to influence
shareholder value precisely because of the publicity they received. As a result, restricting the
data to large nationally reported cases is a measure that should bias the study in favor of finding
an effect on firm value.24 I also chose to focus only on firms that were traded on the New York
Stock Exchange so as to control for broad market changes in the stock index. This proved to be
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A limited c heck su pported this assum ption. I che cked to d etermin e wheth er inform ation pub lished in
one of th e above -referenc ed new spapers w as carried in other m ajor new spapers a nd inva riably five o r six
other major city newspapers ran a similar story on the same day the story was reported in one of the four
papers relied on for this study, with several papers typically carrying the story a day or so later. A number
of prior studies seeking to measure the effect of events on stock prices have focused exclusively on stories
reported in the W all Street Jou rnal. See, e.g., Bhaga t et al, supra note 13 at 15; Her sch, supra note 13, at
141 . While the Wall Street Journal is likely the best single source of information for investors, restricting
the study to one paper appears unnecessary, particularly since the number of individuals holding stock has
increased substantially in the last dec ade. See Cheryl R ussell & M arcia M ogelon sky, Riding High on the
Market, A MER . D EMOGRAPHICS 46, 48 (April 2000) (noting that In 1998, nearly 49% of households owned
stock, up from 3 2 percen t a decade earlier). Nev ertheless, w ith only a fe w exce ptions, m ost of the law suits
analyze d in this stud y were re ported in the Wall S treet Journ al, and a sep arate analy sis of the case s that only
appeare d in that pa per foun d no sign ificant differe nce with the results ge nerally rep orted in this stu dy.
When the story appeared in more than one newspaper, the stories generally ran on the same day. On the
few occ asions w hen the sto ries ran on different d ays, I relied o n the earliest d ate as the ev ent date.
24
An exc eption to th is principle m ight arise du e to the size o f the firms th at are includ ed in the an alysis, all
of which are larg e firms. While these firm s are likely to garner the m ost publicity, they are also in the best
position to absorb the financial costs of the suit. In contrast, smaller firms may have more to lose through a
class action la wsuit to the extent the in forma tion relating to the com pany w as available to investor s. This is
less likely w ith smaller c ompa nies beca use in add ition to their lo wer new s coverag e they are also typica lly
covered by few er stock an alysts.
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a very modest limitation because there were only three class action lawsuits reported by the
national press for firms traded on other exchanges.25
Limiting the study to publicly traded companies proved a more significant
restriction than excluding companies traded on exchanges other than the NYSE. Although such
a limitation is obviously necessary for a study measuring the effect on stock prices, it had the
effect of eliminating several of the largest class action suits, including a case against State Farm
that settled for approximately $157 million, an $81 million suit against Publix, and the high
profile sexual harassment cases against Mitsubishi motors that ultimately settled for $45
million.26 Neither State Farm nor Publix is publicly traded, and Mitsubishi is traded only on the
Japanese stock exchange. Additionally, suits against governments, which make up a significant
portion of the class actions that have been filed or settled in the last decade, were likewise
excluded from the study.27
The stock prices were drawn from publicly available sources, including
yahoo!finance, and siliconinvestor. Where data was missing from those sources, newspapers
and publications that list historical stock prices were used to supplement the data. The Standard
and Poors 500 index was used to measure the expected returns over time.
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The three cases involved O’Charley’s and Rent-A-Center, both of which trade on the NASDAQ, and
Crow n Centra l Petroleum which tra des on th e Am erican Sto ck Exc hange . See Settlem ent Rea ched in S uit
Over Alleged Racial Bias, W ALL S T . J., July 23, 1 996, at B 4 (discussin g $7.5 m illion settleme nt with
O’Ch arley’s); Crown Central is Sued for Alleged Gender, Race Discrimination, W ALL S T . J., July 1, 1997,
at C23 (d escribing the filing of c lass action su it); Rent-A-Center, Inc., W ALL S T . J., July 10, 2000, at A15
(noting $ 2 million settlemen t for sex disc riminatio n suit invo lving Re nt-A-C enter). Rent-A-Center
subsequ ently enter ed a settlem ent in a diffe rent case fo r $47 m illion. See Kristin Downey Grimsley, RentA-Cen ter to Pay $ 47 Millio n to Settle Se x-Bias Su it, W ASH . P OST , Mar. 9, 2002, at A9.
26
See Kathy B ergen & Carol K leiman, Mitsubishi Will Pay $34 Million: The Biggest Settlement in a Sexual
Harassm ent Suit is Se en as a W ake-Up Call, C H I . T R I B U N E, June 12 , 1998, at A 1; Philip H ager, State Farm
to Pay Women $157 Million for Job Bias, L.A. T IMES , April 29, 2002, at A1. There were two cases
involvin g Mitsub ishi, one filed by the E EOC settled for $3 4 Million while a pr ivate suit settled for $9.5
million. See Mitsubishi Harassment Settlement Approved, N.Y. T IMES , June 26, 1998, at D20 (court
approv ed $34 million settlem ent in case file d by EE OC, w hich follo wed $9 .5 million se ttlement in private
suit).
27
The largest discrimination settlement to date was, in fact, filed against the United States in a twenty-year
old case in volving the Voic e of Am erica. See Bill Miller & David A . Vise, U.S. Settles Job Bias Case: A
Record $508 M illion is Due Wom en in US IA Dispu te, W ASH . P OST , Mar. 23 , 2000, at A 01.
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This study isolates two relevant events: (1) the filing of a lawsuit and (2) the
notice of a settlement. In some cases, only one event was reported, typically the filing of the
lawsuit but there were also several cases where the settlement was reported while the original
case filing was not. Other significant litigation events are occasionally reported in the
newspapers, but they did not seem as likely to influence investment decisions, in large part
because the events were reported infrequently. For example, the required court approval of a
settlement agreement was occasionally noted in national newspapers but it was rare that the
approval differed from the original notice of settlement, and therefore does not seem likely to
impact investor decisions.28 Newspapers also frequently report when the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission joins, or seeks to join, an existing lawsuit, or when a class was
certified, but these occurrences were too rare to measure, and again not clearly of interest to
investors.29
The cases that are included in the database are described in the accompanying
Appendices One and Two. The study includes thirty-three class action lawsuits filed against
publicly-traded corporations, and twenty-six settlements against publicly-traded corporations.30
Only six of the cases appear in both files, as many of the cases have not yet been resolved and
other cases that were settled during the study’s timeframe were initially filed before the starting
28

The only exception involved the sex discrimination suit against Smith Barney, which the district judge
initially refuse d to app rove. See Peter Tru ell, Judge Re jects Proposed P act in Sex Ha rassment Ca se, N.Y. T IMES ,
June 25, 1998, at D20. The Court ultimately approved a revised agreement. See Patrick M cGeeh an, Judge
Approves Class-Action Settlement for Sex Harassment at Smith Barney, W ALL S T . J., July 27, 1 998, at B 6.
29
It is conceivable that investors would assume that the resources of the EEOC would significantly affect
the outcome of the litigation, though this assumption often proves incorrect. Particularly in the last decade,
the EEOC has often jumped into litigation well after the case has commenced, or even after it has settled as
it did in the ca se against T exaco, an d seem s to do so p rimarily as a public re lations veh icle. See text
accom panyin g notes 2 60-62 , infra. Nevertheless, it is certainly possible that investors would treat EEOC
interventio n as me aningfu l, but this study did not m easure tha t effect.
30
This num ber of cases falls within the ran ge used in prev ious event studies. See, e.g., John M. Bizjak &
Jeffrey L . Coles, The Effect of Private Antitrust Litigation on the Stock-Market Valuation of Firms, 85
A MER . E C O N . R EV . 436, 442 (19 95) (samp le of 26 cases); Sanjai B hagat, John B izjak & Jeffrey L . Coles,
The Sh arehold er Wea lth Implica tions of Co rporate L awsuits , 27 FI N A N. M G T . 5, 16 (1998) (sample size for
defendant settlements of 29); Mark S. Johnson, Ron C. Mittelhammer & Don P. Blayney, Stock Price
Reaction to R egulation in the M eat Packing In dustry, 45 J. OF A GRIC . E C O N . 31, 35 (1993) (sample size of
23).
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date. It also appears that some resolutions are not reported in the national press even when the
filing was. Race discrimination cases accounted for nearly 65% of the class action filings, with
nearly three times as many race (22) as sex discrimination (8) claims. There were only two age
discrimination claims, as well as one claim based on National Origin, though several cases
included multiple allegations. Two-thirds (22) of the cases have been filed since 1996, the year
of the much publicized settlement involving Texaco.
The settlements are more evenly divided among race, sex and age discrimination
claims, with 10, 9 and 4 respectively. The aggregate value of the settlements total more than $1
billion, with a mean recovery of $44.3 million and a median of $28 million. The mean recovery
for race discrimination claims was $58.9 million, with a median of $28 million, while the sex
discrimination claims yielded about half as much, with a mean recovery of $24.9 and a median
recovery of $10 million. Consistent with past studies, the age discrimination claims produced
the largest settlements with a mean recovery of $71.12 million and a median of $46.75.
However, in this instance, the mean figure for age discrimination cases was significantly skewed
by a $183 million settlement against Lockheed-Martin. It is also worth noting that all of the
cases were the product of a negotiated settlement; none of the cases was resolved through a trial.
Indeed, in only one case, that involving Lucky Stores in 1992, was there even a trial to determine
the defendant’s liability.31 There was also no case where the defendant prevailed at trial. When
these cases are resolved, it is invariably by settlement rather than trial.
C. The Statistical Analysis.
As previously noted, the statistical portion of this study relies on a technique
known as an event study. Event studies, in turn, rely on the efficient markets hypothesis, which

31

See Stender v. Lucky Stores, 803 F. Supp . 259 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
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states in its strong form that new information is quickly incorporated into stock prices.32 This
assumption has been borne out in many prior event studies which have found that new
information is typically incorporated into a stock price within one to three days of the event
having been reported.33
An event study seeks to measure the effect of a particular event, in this instance
the filing and settling of class action employment discrimination litigation, on a firm’s stock
price. For the purposes of the statistical analysis, an event is defined as the publication of the
story in one of the four newspapers described earlier, and the date of publication is defined as the
event date. For each event, the day the story was published is defined as day 0, and the previous
trading day is represented as -1, and together these two days make up the event period.34 A twoday event period helps capture any changes that might have occurred the day before the
particular event. This is especially important in the case where information leaked into the
market prior to the official announcement, and event studies commonly used a two-day period.35
32

The sem inal work defining the efficient m arkets hy pothesis is E ugene F. Fama , Efficient Capital
Markets: A R eview of Theo ry and Em pirical Work , 25 J. F IN . 383 (19 70). Alth ough th e efficient m arkets
hypoth esis is not with out its critics, the m odel un derlies m ost event stu dies. See, e.g., John M. Bizjiak &
Jeffrey L. Coles, supra note –, at 438 (relyin g on efficient m arkets hypothe sis to measure effect o f antitrust
litigation); K athleen E ngelm ann & Bradfo rd Corn ell, Measuring the Cost of Corporate Litigation: Five
Case Studies, 17 J. L EGAL S T U D . 377, 37 8 & n.3 (1988) (noting th at “we are implicitly ass uming marke ts
are efficien t”); W. Kip Viscusi & Joni Her sch, supra note 13, at 216 (“The underlying assumption is that
stock m arkets op erate in an e fficient ma nner.”).
33
See Eugen e F. Fam a, Efficient Capital Markets II, 46 J. OF F INANCE 1575, 1601 (1991) (“The typical
result in event studies on daily data is that, on average, stock prices seem to adjust within a day to event
annou ncem ents.”); M ichael I. M uogha lu, et al., Hazardous Waste Lawsuits, Stockholder Returns, and
Deterrence, 57 SO U T H E R N E C O N . J. 357, 362 (1990) (stock prices adjusted within a day of annou ncement);
Wallace N. Dav idson, et al., The Effectiveness of O SHA P enalties: A Stock-M arket Based T est, 33
I NDUSTRIAL R E L A T IO N S 283, 290 (1994) (finding that “the stock mark et reaction is confined to a very
narrow period (e .g., the three- day interv al)”). Occa sionally the re can be a delay b efore the in forma tion is
incorpo rated. See Viscusi & Hersch , supra note 13, at 222 (finding a delay of 5 days before an effect was
felt by age nt orang e litigation).
34
To the extent the story was first published over the weekend, the next Monday was treated as the event
date, with th e prior Frid ay define d as the da y before .
35
See A. Craig MacK inlay, Event Studies in Economics and Finance, 35 J. OF E C O N . L IT . 13, 14-15 (1997)
(sugges ting a three -day ev ent period ); Bhaga t & Rom ano, supra note 13, at 11-12 (discussing defining the
event pe riod); San jai Bhaga t, John Biz jak & Jef frey L. C oles, The Shareholder Wealth Implications of
Corpo rate Law suits, 27 FINANCIAL M G T . 5 15 (1998) (using two-day event period); Wallace N. Davidson,
Dan W orrell & L ouis T. W . Cheng , The Effectiveness of O SHA P enalties: A Stock-M arket Based T est, 33
I NDUSTRIAL R E L A T IO N S 283, 29 0 (1994 ) (using a th ree-day event pe riod); M ark S. Joh nson, et al., Stock
Price Re gulation in the Meat Pa cking Industry , 45 J. OF A GRIC . E C O N . 31, 34 (1994) (using three-day event
window).
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This study relies on the dummy variable technique and uses ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression analysis.36
The event period provides the means to identify whether the filing or settlement
impacts a firm’s stock price during the two-day event period with the expectation that the impact
will be negative. While a simplistic assessment can be made by comparing the stock price the
day the announcement was made with the price several days earlier, this assessment may ascribe
a correlation to the event when the change in the stock price is actually the result of an overall
market change, or a continuation of a firm’s stock price trajectory. Therefore, to isolate the
effect of the event, it is necessary to calculate what are defined as abnormal returns, the returns
that would not otherwise be expected based on past or future patterns.37 There are various ways
to calculate the expected return, one of which is based on the progression of a firm’s stock price,
while the more common technique relies on market trends.38 This study relies on a market
model by measuring a stock’s past performance against the general market return. In other
words, the model captures the expected returns as measured against the changes in the broad
market, and I rely on the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index as a general market indicator.
Two aspects of the market model bear mentioning. First, the model assumes a
linear relation between the stock price and the market measure, so that if the S&P 500 goes up
100 points it is possible to predict the corresponding expected return of the particular stock.
Second, the market model provides an imperfect measure since it will rarely offer a strong
prediction of a particular stock price, a limitation that will be discussed further below.39 The
expected returns are calculated by using a standard market parameter of the 120 days prior to the
event and 45 days after the announcement day period to provide a statistical estimate of the

36
37
38
39

See C AMPBELL , supra note 14 at 158; Prin ce and R ubin, supra note 13 at 51-52 .
See Fama, supra note 33, at 1601-02 (discussing role of abnorm al returns).
See MacK inlay, supra note 35, at 14-15.
See infra p.24.
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normal return that would have been expected had the event not occurred. The actual return is
then compared to the expected return to provide the abnormal return.
1. The Results.
This statistical analysis requires a four-step process, which is described in detail
in Appendix Three. As indicated in Table One [tables are in separate file and table one would go
about here], the analysis found that there was no significant effect on stock prices from either the
filing of a lawsuit or the announcement of a settlement, and these findings held true regardless of
the nature of the suit or the magnitude of the settlement. There was, however, some variation
among the individual lawsuits, and seven of the individual equations produced statistically
significant results at the .10 level. Four of the filings – those against Albertson’s, CBS, MetLife
and Microsoft – had statistically significant effects on the stock prices, although these four cases
display no obvious pattern. For example, two of the cases involved sex discrimination
allegations, while two involved race discrimination. To the extent a pattern exists, all of the
cases were filed within the last two years, and three were filed within the last year. The fact that
the recent cases had a significant effect on stock prices may be attributable to an increased
awareness regarding the potential financial impact of the suits as a result of the recent string of
high profile cases, such as Texaco and Coca-Cola. Nonetheless, there were ten other cases filed
during the same time period that were not significant.
Table Two [place near here] indicates a similar lack of aggregate significance in
the settlement cases, and notably the size of the settlement was not related to whether the case
had a significant effect. For example, the $120 million settlement agreement entered into by
Interstate Brands (the makers of Wonder Bread) had no greater effect on the company’s stock
price than the $8 million settlement agreed to by AlliedSignal. Three of the individual
settlements produced statistically significant results: the Texaco settlement involving race
16

discrimination, a $33 million agreement involving Winn-Dixie that included allegations of both
race and sex discrimination, and a race discrimination resolution entered into by Morgan Stanley
that did not include any monetary award. Of these, only the Texaco settlement had a negative
effect on the firm’s stock price, while the other two agreements positively affected the price.
2. Explaining the Statistical Analysis.
The above findings cast doubt on several of the reigning myths regarding
employment discrimination litigation. Indeed, for many years it has been argued that the costs of
employment discrimination lawsuits are devastating to corporations and therefore should be
limited so as to reduce the harm the suits produce.40 Yet, based on the data analyzed here, there
is no indication that firms suffer a significant loss of shareholder value as a result of the filing of
a lawsuit; indeed, the filing of a lawsuit appears to be of little direct interest to investors. This is
not because investors are unconcerned about the costs of the lawsuits, but as discussed in more
detail below, because the potential costs are too insignificant to prompt investment decisions.
Moreover, given that, even with the settlements, the loss to firm value does not generally exceed
the costs of the lawsuit, there appears to be little reputational damage that results from being
accused of discrimination. As detailed in the next section, firms often react quickly to reduce
possible reputational damage that might arise from the lawsuits, and often do so effectively, and
their swift actions may limit collateral damage from the suits.41
The absence of significance from the filing of a lawsuit may not seem unusual
because a filing sends no particular message to investors other than that a firm will incur legal
costs. The filing of a lawsuit does not indicate that a firm is actually discriminating, or that it
will be found liable and many lawsuits terminate shortly after they are filed, often without any

40

See genera lly W ALTER K. O L S O N, T HE E XCUSE F ACTORY : H O W E MPLOYMENT L AW IS P A R A L Y Z IN G T H E
A MER . W ORKPLACE (1997) ; R I C H A R D E PSTEIN , F O R B I D D EN G R O U N D S: T HE C ASE A GST . E M P L O Y M E N T
D I S C R IM I N A T IO N L A W (1992) ; P HILLIP H OWARD , T HE D EATH OF C O M M O N S ENSE 134(19 94).
41
See infra sec. III.A.
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relief at all. This is not, however, true of the majority of cases tracked in this suit.42 While a
number of cases are still pending, and some have undoubtedly been resolved without any
attendant publicity, the vast majority of cases that were resolved resulted in significant relief for
the plaintiff class. Based on this sample, the success rate of class action employment litigation
appears to exceed the rate for employment discrimination cases more generally.43 This is likely
attributable to the costs and difficulties of filing, and litigating, class action cases, perhaps
evidenced by the fact that only a handful of law firms regularly file discrimination class actions,
and one law firm in particular is responsible for a disproportionate number of suits.44 It also
appears that investors do not anticipate that the filing of a lawsuit will result in litigation fees
sufficiently large to adversely impact the firm. This may be true either because the fees are not
expected to be particularly high given the size of the firm or because the fees are treated as an
operating cost that has already been factored into the stock price. Somewhat contrary to
common perceptions, the assumption that litigation costs will be relatively modest appears to be
supported by the realities of the litigation,. For example, in the hotly contested litigation
involving Home Depot, a case that settled on the eve of trial, the defendant’s fees were estimated
to have totaled $5 million.45 These fees are not insignificant but in the context of a firm the size
of Home Depot, they are not especially consequential either.

42

Of the cas es in this study , in only the Nordstro m’s case was the d ismissal rep orted in the news. See
Sylvia W ieland N ogaki, Nordstrom Bias Suit Dropped, C H I . T R I B U N E, Nov. 1 5, 1992 , at C14.
43
Emplo ymen t discrimin ation cases have lon g had su ccess rates low er than oth er classes of c ivil claims.
See Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models & Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 G EO .
L.J. 1567, 1578 (1989) (documenting a success rate of 22% for employment discrimination cases). In a
recent comprehensive analysis of trial and appellate outcomes, Professors Clermont and E isenberg
concluded, “Job discrimination plaintiffs are one of the least successful classes of plaintiffs at the trial-court
level, in that th ey fare w orse at trial than almost an y other ca tegory o f civil case.” K evin M . Clermo nt &
Theod ore Eisen berg, Plaintiph obia in th e Appe llate Cou rts: Civil Righ ts Really D o Differ from Negotia ble
Instrume nts, unpublished manuscript at 11, forthcoming in the ILLINOIS L A W R EVIEW (2002) .
44
The law firm is now called Sap erstein Go ldstein De mcha k & Be llar, and is disc ussed in m ore detail in
section III.B. Of the suits tracked in this study, the Saperstein firm was involved in Home Depot, Den ny’s,
Shone y’s, State Fa rm, Pub lix, Luck y’s, Albe rtson’s, Saf eway, a nd Sou thern Ca lifornia Ed ison.
45
See Facing Hammer, Home Depot Decides to Deal, A MER . L AWYER , Nov. 1997, at 38 (noting that
Home D epot spent $5 million in legal fees prior to trial).
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The fact that the settlements had no significant effect on the stock price may seem
more puzzling but can also be explained in a number of ways. First, it is important to highlight a
limitation on a study of this nature where only limited controls are imposed to measure the
movement of a stock price. Although I have used standard event studies methodology, the
statistical model does not always offer a substantial explanation of an expected return to a stock
price, in large part because it is often difficult to predict stock price movements. What this
study measures is whether a stock price moves differently from what was expected but given that
stock price movements often belie our expectations it can be difficult to accurately predict
expected returns.
Another reason a firm’s stock price may not be affected by the settlement is that
the stock market may have been anticipating a larger monetary award than was ultimately
obtained.46 For example, in the case of Coca-Cola, to date the largest and the most recent class
action settlement, it is possible that the market was expecting a judgment in excess of the actual
reported award of $192.5 million, particularly since the Texaco case had only recently received
so much attention and Coca-Cola was enmeshed in a difficult public relations battle involving
the negative implications of the lawsuit.47
It also seems clear that the damages – even at this level – are simply too small to
affect corporations the size of Coca-Cola, Texaco or Home Depot, or most of the other firms
involved in this study. For example, the $104 million settlement agreed to by Home Depot
amounted to two weeks’ pretax profit.48 Table Three [place about here] provides a
representative representative sampling of the relation of the settlement to the firm’s
46

See Kathleen Engelm ann & Bradfo rd Corn ell, supra note 13, at 393 (when settlements are lower than
expecte d firm v alue ma y increase ); Prince an d Rubin , supra note 13, at 19 (noting that positive returns from
settlements may indicate investors were expecting higher mon etary relief).
47
See Davan Maha raj, Coca-C ola to Settle R acial Bia s Lawsu it: Soft Drink Giant A grees to P ay $19 2.5
Million O ver Allega tions It Trea ts Blacks U nfairly, L.A. T IMES , Novem ber 17, 2 000, at A 1.
48
See C HRIS R OUSH , I NSIDE H OME D E P O T: H O W O NE C O M P A N Y R E V O L U T IO N I Z ED A N I N D U S T R Y T HR O U G H
THE R ELENTLESS P URSUIT OF G ROWTH 78 (1999).
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capitalization. Outside of the case involving Shoney’s, the remaining settlements all fell below
3.5% of a firm’s capitalization, with both the Home Depot and Coca-Cola falling below one
percent. Previous studies have found that the size of the firm positively effects results so that the
lawsuits have less of an impact on large firms,49 and all of the firms included in the sample were
large firms.
It is also possible, for both the filings and the settlements, that information had
leaked into the market prior to the official event, thus allowing investors to adjust their
expectations prior to the actual announcements. There is even the possibility that substantial
insider trading may have affected stock prices before the official announcements.50 While it
remains possible that information leaked out into the market before the news was reported, there
is no empirical evidence to support the theory, and it seems more likely that the events did not
have a significant effect on prices rather than that substantial insider trading occurred.
The fact that neither the filings nor the settlements has a significant effect on
stock prices suggests that there is no market penalty associated with being accused of
discrimination, or from having reached a negotiated settlement in a discrimination suit. It would
certainly be possible to imagine that investors would disinvest from discriminatory firms, but
there is little evidence to suggest that investors shun firms that have been accused of
discrimination or settled discrimination cases.51 The fact that discrimination suits do not extract
significant value from firms, while perhaps contrary to common perceptions, may be expected
once we realize that social investing remains a very small part of the investment world, and even
49

See Sanjai Bh agat, et al., The Sh arehold er Wea lth Implica tions of Co rporate L awsuits , 27 FI N A N C IA L
M G T . 5, 25 (1998).
50
Insider trad ing has b een sho wn to m ove stock prices, often significantly . See Lisa K. M eulbroe k, An
Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, 47 J. OF F INANCE 1661 (1992). Less clear is how insider
trading is recognized by the market, though there does seem to be evidence that it is recognized, perhaps by
its volum e. See id. at 1693-95.
51
The on e excep tion, discuss ed in the n ext section , is the case ag ainst Tex aco that inv olved w idely
publicized tapes that appeared to include racial epithets. When the story first broke, there was widespread
selling, but the disinvestment proved only temporary, and most of the lost value was restored within a
month of the initial alleg ations. See infra text accompanying notes 87-89
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within the realm of social investors employment practices generally do not factor into the
investment decision.52
In addition to the monetary costs of the suits, firms are undoubtedly concerned
with the potential reputational costs of the lawsuits, but here there appears to be little cost
outside of the unusual case that receives high publicity typically for overt forms of racial
discrimination.53 Indeed, based on past studies of lawsuits in other areas, it appears that
employment discrimination lawsuits have less stigma attached to them than other kinds of
lawsuits, such as product liability claims. One study involving product recalls found a
significant effect on firm value that exceeded the direct costs of the recall,54 and other studies
have likewise found that the value lost as a result of interfirm corporate lawsuits often exceeds
the costs of the lawsuit, largely because of the reforms companies may need to make as a result
of the litigation.55 However, because discrimination claims rarely lead to substantial corporate
reform, most investors will not be concerned with the fact that a firm has been accused of
discrimination other than as it relates to the potential costs of that discrimination.
Based on the statistical analysis, it appears that neither the filing nor the
settlement of a lawsuit significantly affects a firm’s stock price. Later in this article I will
suggest some of the implications of the study relating to the likelihood that discrimination
litigation will serve as an adequate deterrent against discrimination and to the prospects that the
52

See L AWRENCE E. M ITCHELL , C ORPORATE I RRESPONSIBILITY: A MERICA ’ S N EWEST E XPORT 167-68
(2001) (discussing socially responsible investing.) TIAA-CREF, the largest pension fund in the coun try
with many participants who ought to be sympathetic to social investing, reports that its social investment
accoun t totals $4.4 b illion while its sto ck acco unts are v alued at $ 87.5 billion . See www.tiaa-

cref.org/charts (visited July 1 , 2002).

M any soc ial investm ent funds do not sc reen for lab or practice s.
This has occurred in a handful of cases over the last few years, including Texaco and Denny’s discussed
in the next section, as well as Shoney’s, Mitsubishi and to a lesser extent Coca-Cola.
54
See Gregg Jarrell & Sa m Peltzm an, The Impa ct of Product Re calls on the Wea lth of Sellers, 93 J. O F
P OLITCAL E C O N . 512 (1985).
55
See Sanjai Bh agat, et al., The Costs of Inefficient Bargaining and Financial Distress: Evidence from
Corpo rate Law suits, 35 J. OF F INANCIAL E C O N . 221, 229 (1994) (“Our results indicate that plaintiffs can and
d o da m ag e defen d an ts th rou g h litig ation , but tha t pla intiffs ga in far le ss tha n de fe nda nts los e.”); D a vid M.
Cutler & Lawre nce H. S umm ers, The Costs of Conflict Resolution and Financial Distress: Evidence from
the Texaco-Pennzoil Litigation, 19 RA N D J. OF E C O N . 157, 164 (1 988) (finding that the lawsuit jointly cost
shareho lders $1 b illion).
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market will eradicate discriminatory firms, as has long been argued by law and economics
scholars.56 But before doing so, I want to discuss three case studies to determine what effect
employment discrimination class actions have within firms.
III. DO THE LAWSUITS PRODUCE MEANINGFUL CHANGE?
THREE CASE STUDIES
The last section of this article sought to determine how, or whether, the class
action litigation affects stock prices of firms named as defendants. Stock prices, however,
provide only one measure of the potential impact of a lawsuit, and in this section I will present
three case studies to explore how the lawsuits affect the internal company practices, including
what changes the firms made as a result of the settlement agreements. This analysis inevitably
provides only a limited insight into the company’s response to the lawsuit because it does not
take into account whether the corporate culture has changed, other than as measured in
numerical changes in personnel, purchasing agreements and other tangible actions. Measuring
changes in corporate culture is a difficult task that requires extensive observation both before
and after the lawsuits, something that is generally infeasible other than by the company itself –
though its own biases often preclude an honest assessment of just how much things have actually
changed.57 Nevertheless, the case studies provide significant insight into what changes the
lawsuits prompted, and also provide three distinct models for how companies respond to the
suits, what I label the public relations model, the recalcitrance model and the reform model.
A. Texaco: The Public Relations Model.
1. The Lawsuit and the Tapes.

56

See section IV infra.
This part of the study is based on available public information, primarily from court decisions and
journalist ac counts, inc luding se veral boo k-length treatmen ts. For a varie ty of reaso ns, I decide d not to rely
on interviews, although I have spoken with a number of attorneys who have been involved in the cases and
those conversations have likely influenced some of my thinking.
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Although the case against Texaco is perhaps now the most famous employment
discrimination case to arise in the last decade, the controversy began in a much quieter fashion.
The suit was originally filed in 1994 by two African-American employees who sought class
action status for their salary and promotion claims, and when filed the suit received virtually no
national attention.58 At the time of the suit, Texaco was the fourth largest United States oil
company with 19,000 employees, of whom approximately 23% were African Americans, a
percentage that placed Texaco roughly in the middle of its oil company peers. 59 Texaco also
claimed that 19.4% of its executive level employees were minorities, a figure that was disputed
by the plaintiffs, and after investigating the company’s practices both the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and the Department of Labor found Texaco’s promotional policies
deficient.60
The case, which was initiated by a law firm that had not handled a civil rights
case in twenty years, was largely statistical in nature, involving both claims of disparate
treatment and disparate impact.61 From the evidence that is available, it appears the claims with
the greatest chance for success were based on the disparate impact theory, though it is difficult to
say more than that because during the two years the case was active most of the litigation
involved discovery disputes and no class had been certified prior to the settlement.62 It is
58

See Alison Fr ankel, Tale of the Tapes, T HE A MER . L AWYER 64, 68 (Mar. 1997) (“Before the tapes
surfaced , the Texa co race d iscrimina tion case h ad receiv ed a sm all amou nt of press c overag e . . .”).
59
See David Iv anovich ,M. Sixe l & Chris W oodya rd, Oil Indu stry Strugg ling With Diversity , H O U S T O N
C H R O N ., Nov. 11, 1996, at A1 (“Texaco’s record for hiring and promoting minorities . . . is about average
when comp ared with other m ajor oil com panies . . .”).
60
The Department of Labor had conducted two investigations and in both found Texaco’s promotion
policies de ficient. See Kurt Eic henw ald, The Two Faces of Texaco, N.Y. T IMES , Nov. 10, 1996, at C1, C6
(discussing Department of Labor reviews that found “wide disparities between the promotion rates of whites
and nonwhites at Texaco”).
61
In a decision awarding attorneys fees, the district court summarized the case as follows: “[T]he amended
complaint charged that . . . Texaco had by certain employment policies and practices, engaged in conduct
that had a disparate impact upon and abridged the rights of salaried African-American employees of Texaco
in promotions, compensation, and the terms and conditions of their employment, including training and job
assignmen ts.” Roberts v. Texa co, 979 F.Su pp. 185, 18 9 (S.D.N.Y . 1997). The statistical portion of the case
was base d on a d isparate im pact claim , which lik ewise for med th e basis for th e class allegatio ns. See
Franke l, supra note 58, at 67 (noting that “the plaintiffs lawyers tried to show the court that the reason for
the disparate impact was racial discrimination.”).
62
See id. (noting th at a class certifica tion hearin g was sch eduled fo r Decem ber 6, 19 96).
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significant that the strongest claims involved disparate impact allegations because such claims
are tried before a judge, rather than a jury, and are limited to equitable relief rather than
damages.63 Based on an account by one of the plaintiffs, during the mediation and prior to the
revelation of the tapes, the plaintiffs’ statistical expert valued the case at between $10-30
million.64 Other reports have suggested that the plaintiffs estimated their salary claim to be
worth $71 million in backpay.65 The suit became bogged down by a lengthy and decidedly
unproductive government-supported mediation when the case took a dramatic turn that had little
to do with its underlying merits.66
On November 4, 1996, The New York Times published a story based on a
transcript of a secretly tape recorded meeting attended by management officials that included
what appeared to be racial epithets, as well as evidence indicating an intent on the part of Texaco
officials to destroy documents that had been requested by the plaintiffs in the case.67 The tapes
were made by Texaco executive Richard Lundwell, ostensibly to aid him in preparing minutes of
the meeting, and were turned over to the plaintiffs by Lundwell after he was involuntarily retired
by the company.68 The plaintiffs’ attorneys in turn leaked the transcripts to the New York
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See 42 U .S.C. § 20 00e .
See B ARI -E L L E N R OBERTS , R O B E R T S V S . T EXACO : A T RUE S TORY OF R A C E A N D C ORPORATE A MERICA
232 (1998). The author quotes one of the plaintiff’s attorneys, in preparing for the mediation, as saying,
“We think Texaco ought to pay ten million dollars in back wages to the black employees it has been
discrimin ating aga inst for the p ast five yea rs and an other ten m illion dollars to comp ensate. Th row in
attorneys ’ fees and other od ds and en ds and it co mes to th irty million d ollars . . . how ’s that soun d.”
65
See Franke l, supra note 58, at 67 (“[T]he plantiffs’ statistician concluded in his expert witness report that
Texaco’s African-Am ericans were paid $71 million less than comparable no nminority employees . . .”).
66
Based on Roberts’ book, until the tapes were disclosed, there did not appear to be any particular hope
that the case would be resolved short of either summary judgment or trial, as the parties remained engaged
in vicious litig ation. R OBERTS , supra note 64 at188-245.
67
See Kurt Eic henw ald, Texaco Executiv es, On Ta pe Discu ssed Imp eding a Bias Suit , N.Y. T IMES , Nov. 4,
1996, at A1. The article stated that on the tapes “executives are heard referring to black employees as
“black jelly beans” and “niggers”. Id. The “black jelly beans” apparently was borrowed from a metaphor
used in diversity training, and an enhanced version of the tape indicated that the racial epithet had not been
used bu t instead ha d been a reference to St. Nicola s. See note 76 supra.
68
Id. Mr. Lu ndwe ll initially sough t to trade the ta pes to the p laintiffs’ attorn ey in exc hange for their
representation of him in an age discrimination suit against his former employer. The plaintiff attorney
declined to represent Lundwell but did refer him to an attorney, and once Lundwell had retained an attorney,
he turned the tapes over to the plaintiffs in the Roberts case. For the most comprehensive report of the tapes
incident se e Alison F rankel, supra note 58, at 64.
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Times, which ran a story about the tapes on its front page, and the reaction to the tapes was both
immediate and dramatic.

On the day the news was reported, Texaco’s stock price

dropped 3.2% on the New York Stock Exchange.69 While the stock price quickly stabilized
thereafter, the direct economic impact of the newly disclosed tape recordings was a drop in the
value of the stock of approximately $1 billion.70 Several large public investors also reacted
negatively to the revelation of the tapes, and a number of other agencies threatened to divest
their investments.71 Shortly after the New York Times story broke, Jesse Jackson announced that
his organization, the Rainbow PUSH Action Network, would buy Texaco stock in order to gain a
voice in the company, and would likewise initiate a study of the affirmative action policies of
other companies that had directors in common with Texaco, such as Gillette and Campbell
Soup.72 Many outraged Texaco customers contacted the company’s chairman directly, vowing
to destroy their Texaco credit cards,73 and expressing their intent to stop doing business with the
company.74 This action was echoed by local and national efforts to organize protests and
boycotts, and a number of prominent civil rights leaders urged consumers to boycott Texaco and
to sell its stock. 75
69

Kurt Eich enwald , US. Inq uiring Into Texaco ’s Actions in Suit, N.Y. T IMES , Nov. 5 , 1996, at D l.
Alexan der Coc kburn , Oil‘s Swe et Music; R acial Disc rimination Lawsu it Against T exaco, T HE N A T I O N,
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A week after the initial story broke, the New York Times reported that an
enhanced version of the tape recording indicated that no racial epithet had been used in the
conversation, although the allegations of document tampering remained.76 In a masterful bit of
public relations, the plaintiffs’ attorneys declared that the new version of the tapes did not
change matters, and one day later major civil rights groups called for a national boycott,
demanding that Texaco settle the lawsuit quickly, and establish an effective affirmative action
plan to address its racist culture.77 The threat of a national boycott prompted another sell-off of
Texaco’s stock, which declined 2% ($1.875) the day the boycott was announced.78 The timing
of the controversy surrounding the tapes added an additional sense of urgency to the protests, as
California’s anti-affirmative action Proposition 209 had been ratified by the voters only two
weeks earlier and Texaco was quickly seen as an important test case for preserving corporate
affirmative action.79
In what has now become a textbook reaction to negative litigation-related news,
Texaco’s chief executive officer, Peter Bijur reacted quickly and swiftly to defuse the public
outrage that followed the disclosure of the tapes. Bijur, who had only been at the helm for
several months when the news first broke, immediately condemned the acts of the managers that
had been reported on the tape, fired two of them, and stripped two other retirees of their pension
benefits.80 He also appointed a prominent New York attorney to investigate the allegations
76
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26

raised by the tapes, a former esteemed African-American judge, Leon Higginbotham, to
investigate the corporate culture, and declared that the company would take additional actions to
ensure that Texaco became a model employer.81 On November 11, 1996, Texaco formally
announced it was entering into settlement discussions, which had been stalled before the
revelation of the tapes, and on that day Texaco’s stock gained $1.37583 indicating shareholders
82

viewed the potential settlement as softening the total financial impact the case might have on
Texaco’s future. As noted earlier, those gains were all but eliminated by the announcement of
the boycott, though the stock rebounded the following day based on news reports that the
settlement was progressing. Even though the tapes proved far less incriminating than originally
anticipated, the pressure on the company remained intense and its potential liability for the
lawsuit was now estimated to exceed $500 million.84 Reports now indicated that Texaco had
lagged behind its peers in hiring and promoting of African Americans,85 and it was clear that
Texaco was fast becoming a poster child for racism in corporate America. 86
Several days later, on November 15, 1996, Texaco settled the lawsuit for an
amount that was estimated to total $176.1 million, a record setting agreement that caused an
additional significant drop in the stock price of nearly 3%.87 Yet, continuing its schizophrenic
ride, as reflected in Figure One the stock quickly recovered half of the lost value the next day
and by November 25, the stock was trading at a price that was nearly 4% higher than its pre-tape
level. An important industry journal later observed, “Five months after Texaco Inc. was plunged
81
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into its worse-ever public relations disaster . . . it appears to have emerged relatively unscathed.
Between early November – when news of damaging evidence in a race discrimination suit broke
– and the end of March, Texaco’s stock skyrocketed 10% as oil prices slid 11%.”88 By the
middle of 1997, less than a year after the tapes were revealed, Texaco’s stock price reached an
all-time high.89
The settlement agreement included a $115 million settlement fund to compensate
the class members’ monetary claims, attorneys fees and costs, and to cover the costs of
administering the agreement. Texaco also agreed to increase the salaries of all class members by
11.34%, in addition to whatever salary increase the individual was entitled to under Texaco’s
normal review procedures, a process that was estimated to cost the company an additional $22
million.90
In addition to the direct monetary terms, the company agreed to establish a courtordered Diversity Task Force to evaluate, revise, and develop the company’s employment
policies and practices to ensure fair hiring and promotion of minority workers.91 The Task
Force would be comprised of seven members, three appointed by the plaintiffs, three by Texaco,
with the Chair being jointly selected by the two parties. The Task Force was intended to act as
an ongoing oversight committee with a five-year term and was estimated to add an additional
$35 million to the settlement.92 As discussed in more detail below, the Task Force was seen as
both an integral and innovative part of the settlement agreement, and is now becoming a
standard feature in many of the large class action resolutions.93 When the various aspects of the
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settlement were added together, the settlement was valued at $170 million. While the settlement
amount was unquestionably large, the amounts were to be paid out over a five-year period, and
the company’s 1996 revenue alone was $30 billion.94 It is estimated that members of the
plaintiff class averaged $63,000 as part of the settlement, and the lead plaintiffs received
substantially higher awards for their participation in the case.95 A little known fact about the
settlement is that a substantial portion was covered by insurance.96
As a demonstration of its commitment to repairing its image, Texaco also agreed
to implement changes that went beyond the terms of the settlement agreement. Texaco
committed itself to increasing its minority employees by the year 2000 to 29 percent of the
firm’s total from its 1996 level of 23 percent, and to increase its employment of African
Americans from 9 to 13%.97 The firm also pledged to increase the promotion of women and
minorities throughout the firm, and to increase its spending with Minority and Women Owned
Businesses to $200 million a year from its previous annual level of $135 million.98 To ensure the
goals were met, the company agreed to tie a portion of managers’ bonuses to meeting diversity
goals, and also enrolled all of its employees in diversity training.99 Texaco also established
scholarship programs for minorities and women interested in engineering, increased its
recruiting of women and minorities, and became the principal sponsor of Universoul Big Top
Circus, the nation’s only circus owned by African Americans.100
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Attorneys’ fees form a critical, and often controversial, part of any settlement
agreement, and the Texaco case was no exception. The plaintiffs attorneys sought a fee award of
25% of the $115 settlement fund, or a total of more than $28 million.101 Based on their detailed
filings, the plaintiffs actual fees and expenses totaled just over $4 million with an expectation
that they would spend an additional $700,000 administering the settlement, so the plaintiffs
attorneys initially sought a fee award that was nearly six times their actual fees and costs.102 The
district court ultimately awarded $19.1 million in fees, or 5.5 times the actual fees, as well as
another $1 million to be used for future services relating to the decree.103
Although the results of the lawsuit were undeniably impressive, the fee award, by
any measure, was extraordinary, particularly given that most courts, at the direction of the
Supreme Court, have severely limited the availability of fee enhancements in civil rights
cases.104 One of the interesting aspects of the fee award, which is not uncommon in class action
settlements, is that there was no party to contest the application for fees. The fee award came
directly out of the settlement fund, and therefore was of little interest to the defendants, and the
plaintiff class was certainly in an awkward position to challenge the fees of the attorneys who
had brought them such a significant settlement. Even so, as a percentage of the damage award,
16.5%, the fee award was substantially below (in fact, exactly half) the one-third contingency
that remains common among plaintiff attorneys, and was also less than is common in other class
action areas.105
2. Texaco’s Progress.
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Although the company’s settlement, and additional commitments, received
widespread news coverage, its implementation of the planned changes has gone virtually
unexamined. In this section, I will explore the fruits of the settlement, including changes Texaco
has made in response to the lawsuit. I will suggest that much of the company’s implementation
involves a carefully structured public relations campaign that obscures how limited the
company’s changes have actually been – changes that have been implemented with little to no
oversight. Moreover, although the plaintiff class clearly has benefited from the suit, others who
were not parties to the suit – women, minority contractors and the diversity industry – have
benefited at least as much, and in some instances far more than the plaintiff class.
Table Four [place about here], which is based on the reports issued by the
Diversity Task Force (“Task Force”), indicates the percentages of female and minority
employees, new hires and promotions. Between 1997 and 2000, the percentage of minority
employees, which includes minority group members other than African Americans, increased
from 20.3% to 22.4% of the total, although minorities represented 44.0% of Texaco’s new hires
in 1999.106 African Americans constituted 10.0% of the employees in 1999, an increase from
9.1% in 1996 but below the modest goal that had been established by the company.107 Although
minorities received nearly 25% of the promotions in 1997, and 21.4% in 1998, the number of
minority executives increased only 2% from 8.5% to 10.4%, and in 1998 the company failed to
meet the executive level goal it had established, though it exceeded the goal the following year.
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Women generally fared much better, accounting for nearly 50% of the new hires,108 and 57.6%
of the promotions in 1999, though the number of female executives increased by less than 1%, to
8.5% in 1998. In the year 2000, Texaco’s efforts at diversifying its workforce stalled, as the
percentage of new hires and promotions declined across the board as did the percentage of
employees and executives. With one year remaining on the settlement agreement, Texaco has
failed to meet any of its numerical goals and remains substantially behind most of the original
goals it had set for itself.
An important aspect of the underlying case involved salary discrepencies for
African-American employees, and part of the settlement agreement required Texaco to analyze
its salary record to identify employees who were deserving of adjustments based on established
objective criteria. In 1997, Texaco made 52 salary adjustments, among nearly 7,500 salaries that
were reviewed, but nearly half of the adjustments went to white men and only three of the
adjustments went to African-American employees.109 The Task Force saw this as a sign that
“salary-related issues are relatively limited at Texaco, and the adverse impact of salary-related
issues is not disproportionately concentrated among minorities.”110 The Report failed to note,
however, that the salary claim was a core component of the plaintiff’s class action allegations.
As noted earlier, outside of the confines of the settlement agreement, Texaco
developed a Minority and Women’s Business Development Program (“MWBE”) to increase its
purchases and affiliations with women and minorities. In its annual reports, the Task Force has
108
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reported Texaco’s expenditures in an inconsistent fashion, which makes it difficult to perform an
accurate analysis. Nevertheless, Texaco’s MWBE initiative appears to have been successful in
channeling millions of dollars to women and minority-owned businesses and certainly the most
successful aspect of Texaco’s reforms. In 1998, Texaco spent a total of $230.2 million with
MWBEs,111 and in 1999, 8.8% of Texaco’s discretionary expenditures went to MWBES for a
total of $188 million.112 This level of expenditures placed Texaco in the top quartile of Fortune
500 firms that participated in a purchasing study, and was nearly double the average expenditure
of survey participants.113 Women owned firms, however, received nearly twice as many contract
funds as African-American owned companies.114
In addition to these tangible goals, the company also instituted many qualitative
changes. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the company instituted mandatory diversity
training for all of its employees, with periodic refresher training, and the company also instituted
formal mentoring programs, as well as an ombusman, more aggressive recruiting and seemingly
dozens of task forces to address a wide range of workplace issues. The company also
implemented basic management techniques such as formal job posting, which had previously
been done on a more haphazard basis, along with more formal job descriptions and performance
evaluations. Texaco, partly to meet its diversity plan obligations and partly to improve public
relations, also, hired UniWorld Group, a black-owned advertising agency, to create ads that
would boost the company’s image among minorities, with an account valued at $25 million.115
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As previously mentioned, a cornerstone of the settlement involved the creation of
the Diversity Task Force to oversee the implementation of the decree. The Task Force was
widely heralded at the time, and has been copied in a number of other settlement agreements.116
At the same time, it is often difficult to determine where the Task Force’s loyalties or
responsibilities lie, or what the Task Force has actually accomplished. For example, the annual
reports issued pursuant to the Texaco decree could easily have been written by Texaco’s public
relations department. In assessing the company’s hiring practices, the monitors continually
praise Texaco even though the company repeatedly falls short of its modest goals. The
following excerpt from the Second Annual reports provides a flavor of the nature of the reports:
[T]he overall percentage of minorities in the
workforce increased from 20.3% to 21.1% during 1998.
This 0.8% point change is short of the 1.4% growth
originally planned, but indicates that the Company made
progress in 1998 despite the downturn in business and the
overall workforce reduction . . . The percentage of women
declined from 26.7% to 26.0% in 1998 . . . The decline in the
percentage of women stemmed from the impact of
reductions among service departments . . . that traditionally
employ higher percentages of women than other components
of Texaco.117
The last sentence appears particularly glaring to an experienced employment
attorney because one would certainly want to know why the reductions had occurred more
heavily in female-dominated job categories. Although there may be a valid explanation, the
decline in female representation certainly merited a closer analysis. This statement is by no
means an isolated incident, as each diversity report is replete with similar statements and excuses
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for Texaco’s failure to meet its modest goals.118 Moreover, after four years, the Task Force has
yet to make a single substantial suggestion for how Texaco might change its practices but instead
has opted to embrace whatever changes Texaco has adopted on its own accord.119
Beyond the monetary relief, which was substantial, it is difficult to conclude that
Texaco has made much progress in reforming its culture, particularly when the focus is on its
African-American employees rather than female employees or minority suppliers. Equally clear,
once the monetary settlement was reached, the case was of little interest to the American public,
either in the form of the media120 or investors, or the attorneys who brought the case. Instead the
attorneys turned the case over to a salaried Task Force that by all appearances works for Texaco
rather than the plaintiffs. As I will discuss in more detail later, this model where what is
important to the case is the money that changes hands rather than the structural reforms, has
transformed civil rights class action litigation into something more akin to torts or consumer
class actions, and has largely sapped the cases of their public nature.
B. Home Depot: The Recalcitrance Model.
If Texaco represents the public relations model of class action discrimination
litigation, the cases against Home Depot provide a distinctly different model, one that I label the
recalcitrance model. In this model, the company refuses to acknowledge any problems or
potential liability even while agreeing to make substantial changes and doling out large sums of
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money in settlement.121 A key component of this model is that the settlement largely ends the
matter, as the company, and the plaintiffs, ignore the underlying allegations and prospects for
change once the money has exchanged hands. An important difference with the Texaco-style
case is that there is no pretense of a follow-up, whereas Texaco has devoted considerable effort
and expense to create the appearance of transformation. The Home Depot case also differs from
the Texaco litigation in that it never received anywhere near the national attention that was
heaped on Texaco, as it was devoid of any sensational allegations but instead involved classic
allegations of stereotypical sex discrimination. This allowed Home Depot to lay below the radar
throughout the litigation, and as a result the case had no effect on the company’s stock price
even on a temporary basis.
1. The Case.
Home Depot is now the largest retailing chain of home improvement stores in the
world, and during the 1990s was one of the fastest growing retailers in the United States. In
March 1994, a sex discrimination class action lawsuit was filed against the company’s Western
Division, which included 17,000 female employees in 150 stores located in ten western states.
The case, which also sought class action status on behalf of as many as 200,000 failed
applicants, was filed in federal court in San Francisco and drew one of the few federal judges
with plaintiff’s class action experience.122
The magnitude of the case was compounded by the presence of the attorneys
representing the plaintiff class. Indeed, perhaps the most significant fact of the case was that it
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was brought by the law firm of Saperstein Goldstein, Demchak and Baller, the unquestioned
champion of class action employment discrimination litigation. The Saperstein law firm has
litigated more employment discrimination class action cases than any other firm in the country.
The firm is known not only for the volume of its litigation but also for the success of its
settlements, including record-breaking agreements with State Farm Insurance Company, and the
race discrimination case against Denny’s discussed in the next section. The firm has produced
settlements of one hundred million dollars in a number of other cases, including a series of cases
against grocery store chains on which the Home Depot case was patterned.123 The firm’s
experience provides a sharp contrast to the attorneys who handled the Texaco case who had
limited experience in employment discrimination class actions, and their litigation styles also
proved quite different. While not beyond relying on the media, the Saperstein firm seems
content to allow its cases to stay out of the media, as evidenced by the Home Depot case which
never received front page status.
The case against Home Depot was a classic case of sex discrimination, with an
equally time-tested defense. The primary allegation was that women were consigned to cashier
positions, rather than being allowed to work on the sales floor.124 Unlike the sales associates
positions, the cashier positions rarely led to promotional opportunities, despite Home Depot’s
avowed philosophy of promoting from within. According to the plaintiff’s experts, seventy
percent of cashiers were women, while seventy percent of the salesforce were men, and 94% of
123
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the store managers in the Western Division were men.125 There were also allegations of
discrimination in pay, training and harassment, but the core theory was that Home Depot did not
believe women were sufficiently knowledgeable, or conveyed the proper image, to work on the
sales floor. This was a theory borrowed directly from Saperstein’s successful litigation against
grocery stores where the companies routinely assigned women to the bakery department, rather
than other departments such as produce or meat from which promotions were made.126
Just as the plaintiffs stated a classic case of sex discrimination, the defendants
responded with a classic defense. The company sought to explain the workforce disparities by
arguing that women were not interested in working on the sales floor, that it typically hired
women to be cashiers because that is the job they applied for and the jobs for which they had
previous experience.127 Home Depot also claimed that it preferred to hire employees with
construction trades experience in which there were very few women.128 These are common
defenses in sex discrimination claims, borrowing extensively from a well-known class action
case from the 1980s against Sears, in which the company successfully argued that the lack of
women in commission jobs was due to their lack of interest.129
Another potentially larger case was filed in Louisiana by a different set of
attorneys. The Louisiana suit involved 22,000 female employees in 310 Home Depot stores east
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of the Mississippi and attracted the attention of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, which sought to intervene in the case.130 Despite the size of the case and the
presence of the EEOC, the Louisiana case always paled in significance to the California case,
and was ultimately settled for a fraction of the cost.131
Both cases were based principally on statistical analyses but because of the nature
of sex discrimination the cases could be pursued on a theory of intentional discrimination. The
plaintiffs’ central contention was that women were intentionally consigned to deadend jobs
because they were women, the kind of claim that had formed the basis of suits going back to the
early years of Title VII. In this type of case, the statistics, such as the fact that 70% of women
worked as cashiers, are used as evidence of the company’s intent to assign women to particular
undesirable jobs.132 The attorneys also put together strong anecdotal evidence, particularly from
one of the named plaintiffs who had been assigned to a cash register despite her prior experience
in a lumberyard. Nevertheless, the core of the case depended on seven expert witnesses and
extensive statistical analysis.133 The plaintiffs also included claims of disparate impact
discrimination but the suits centered on the intentional discrimination claims, thus raising the
prospect of damages that could total $300,000 per plaintiff. Together the suits presented Home
Depot with a potential liability of more than $100 billion.
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Given the potential liability, one might expect Home Depot’s stock price to have
suffered, but throughout the litigation Home Depot’s stock price continued its decade-long
ascent. When the California case was filed, Home Depot’s stock price declined but the loss was
recovered the following day.134 In its annual reports, Home Depot mentioned the suit only after
it settled the case, and did so only in relation to the cost of the settlement.135 One reporter noted,
“With tens of millions likely at stake, Wall Street hasn’t paid much attention to the case.”136

Just three days before trial, and after a two-day mandatory mediation with an
experienced defense attorney, the case settled.137 The terms of the settlement included $65
million to the plaintiff class, with an additional $22.5 million for attorneys fees, or 25.7% of the
settlement amount. The 6,569 members of the class who filed claims averaged recoveries of
$9,683.138 Although during the litigation, the applicant class was estimated to include as many
as 200,000 individuals, only 336 applicant class-members were determined to have submitted
valid claims.139 The company also agreed to spend an additional $17 million to settle three other
pending lawsuits, including the case that had been filed in Louisiana. To cover the costs of the
suit, the company took a one-time pretax charge of $104 million, which reduced its earnings by
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8 cents per share.140 The settlement had no apparent effect on the stock price; on the first day of
trading after the settlement was announced, Home Depot’s shares gained 12.5 cents to reach
$53.75 per share.
At the time of the settlement, the company had devoted approximately $5 million
on its defense.141 Assuming the plaintiffs’ attorneys had incurred similar expenses, they received
a substantial premium for their work, one that was quite similar to the enhancement provided in
the Texaco case. One important difference, however, was that the fees in the Home Depot
litigation were specified as part of the settlement, and were valued separately from the class
settlement funds.
2. The Aftermath.
Another distinct contrast with the Texaco litigation, is that the essence of the
Home Depot settlement was money. The agreement did not provide for any specified jobs for
class members, nor did it require any specific goals but instead took the unusual step of allowing
Home Depot to establish the goals it would seek to meet based on criteria set forth in the
decree.142 No Diversity Task Force was created, instead one of Home Depot’s Board Members,
an African-American female, was given the responsibility of overseeing the company’s
implementation of the settlement agreement.143 Home Depot has also been reluctant to provide
any information regarding the changes it has made, and the initial progress report required under
140
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the terms of the consent was filed under seal.144 In contrast, Texaco’s Diversity Task Force
Reports are readily-available on their website.145
Based on the limited progress reports, as well as information Home Depot has
made available in the form of a Social Responsibility Report, it appears that women have made
small gains within the company’s employment structure since the suit was settled.
Companywide, the percentage of women employed at Home Depot did not increase at all
between 1996-99, remaining at 35% every year.146 The percentage of women working as Sales
Associates in the Western Division, in contrast, increased from 16% to 22% between 1996 and
March 2000, a 37.5% increase.147 A similar increase was registered companywide, where the
percentage of female Sales Associates rose from 14% to 20%.148 The Joint Report filed with the
Court also indicates that women accounted for 37% of the Sales Associates who were hired from
an internal pool, while only 19% of those who were hired from an external pool were women.149
But the report provides no comparative statistics to past practices, nor does it provide any
indication of how these percentages translate to actual jobs or relate to the percentage of female
applicants. Indeed, the report, which totals one and a half pages, is totally unilluminating, noting
only that, “These percentages are several times higher than the percentage of women in these
positions before the Consent Decree was approved.”150 However, it appears that these figures
fall well short of the company’s own benchmarks.
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According to the parties, the primary innovation the lawsuit has produced is that
Home Depot now posts its jobs companywide, and also has created an in store-system that
allows existing employees and applicants to bid for new jobs.151 The system replaces what had
been a decentralized process that allowed store managers to steer applicants to particular jobs,
though managers continue to make the final selections based on a list of qualified applicants.152
The company also instituted a process that requires managers to interview at least three
candidates for every position, a system that has been in place for government hiring for at least
forty years.153 While the system may be an improvement over the company’s past practices, it
can hardly be defined as innovative. As was the case with Texaco, one significant result of the
lawsuit is that the plaintiff class forged superior, but common, management techniques on a
company that was steeped in inefficient old habits. The company, however, has maintained that
it was planning to overhaul its practices even without the lawsuit, and contends that it simply did
what it was planning to do, though within a slightly earlier timeframe.154
In a remarkable end to the litigation, the parties recently jointly moved to
terminate the consent decree a full eighteen months early. The five page document supporting
the motion offers only summary statistical information on the most recent six month period, and
provides no indication of how women have fared overall in either sales positions or
151
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promotions.155 Perhaps most revealing, the report acknowledges that Home Depot had failed to
meet its benchmarks, which the parties sought to explain by noting the “dynamic nature of the
qualified pool.”156 Despite these obvious limitations, the Court approved the motion shortly after
it was filed.157
Although there are similarities with the Texaco case, the differences are far more
pronounced. Home Depot has provided extremely limited information on its progress, and
maintains that it never had any need for improvement. Nor has the company sought any
recognition as a best place for Women to Work, though Fortune Magazine continues to list the
company as one of the most admired retailers in the country.158 This is in part due to the limited
attention the lawsuit brought, which meant that Home Depot had less of a need to repair its
public image than was the case for Texaco. It may also have something to do with the difference
in the underlying basis for the suit. While there is a clear societal consensus against race
discrimination, and no company wants to be labeled as racist, we have far less of a consensus
regarding sex discrimination, particularly when that discrimination is based on common
stereotypes, as was the case for Home Depot.159 Women suing to gain access to the lumberyard
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feels very different from a case based on intentional race discrimination, particularly when that
discrimination includes racial epithets.
C. Denny’s: The Reform Model.
The final case study is not an employment discrimination case but rather involves a
number of lawsuits brought pursuant to the federal public accommodations statute, known as
Title II.160 Although the allegations concerned discrimination in service, the reforms put in place
by Denny’s replicate the aspirations of the employment discrimination suits already discussed.
And indeed, as analyzed in detail below, Denny’s provides the best example of what I call the
“reform model,” as the company implemented wide-ranging and meaningful changes in response
to a series of high-profile lawsuits surrounding its discriminatory service policies. At the same
time, as was also true of the Texaco case, many of the most meaningful changes occurred
outside of the context of the $54 million agreements that ended the class action litigation and
instead arose as a result of an agreement with a national Civil Rights group that was intended to
reshape its business practices. The cases against Denny’s, thus provide, some insight into the
way actual reform can be accomplished.
1. The Cases.
The allegations against Denny’s originally arose in 1991 when a number of AfricanAmerican college students in Northern California, returning from a local NAACP conference,
alleged that they were required to pay a cover charge and to prepay for their meals late at night,
while white customers were able to eat without either a cover charge or prepayment.161 This
allegation received little national attention, though it did provoke a Justice Department
investigation that ultimately unearthed more than 4,300 complaints nationwide.162 Well-known
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civil rights firms, including the Saperstein firm, undertook representation of the class action in
California and sought class members through various publication notices. The Justice
Department, which has no authority under the public accommodations statute to seek monetary
relief, entered into a consent decree with Denny’s in April 1993 that called for a variety of
reforms and nondiscriminatory pledges.163
On the very same day the Justice Department decree was entered, six African-American
Secret Service officers – dressed in their uniforms and on their way to guard President Clinton
at the Naval Academy – were forced to wait to order at a Denny’s in Anapolis, Maryland while
the white officers traveling with them were served rapidly, including second helpings. The
African-American officers were not served before they had to leave for their detail.164 This case
attracted national headlines and thrust Denny’s firmly into the limelight as a prime example of
how racism remained alive and well in corporate America. From there, the allegations mounted,
including claims of discrimination by a federal judge and his wife, as well as a children’s choir
named after Martin Luther King, Jr. that was refused sit-down service at a Virginia restaurant.
The Maryland case was transformed into a nationwide class action for claims that arose outside
of California and was led by the Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights, assisted by a
prominent Washington law firm. By June 1994, 15 major public accommodations race-bias
suits had been filed against Denny’s, including the two class-action suits described above.165
These allegations came at a precarious financial juncture for Denny’s, whose parent
company was straddled with huge debt accumulated from a leveraged buy-out that had been
fashionable in the late 80s.166 At the time of the lawsuit, Denny’s was the largest family-dining
chain in the country, serving more than one million customers a year at 1,400 restaurants,
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including one third that were franchise-owned. In addition to its flagship Denny’s chain, the
parent company owned a number of other restaurant chains, including Hardees, El Pollo Loco,
Coco’s and Carrow’s, most of which were struggling financially. Denny’s was, in fact, the
company’s most profitable restaurant business, bringing in 39% of the company’s income. In
1993, customer traffic at Denny’s fell 4.1% largely as a result of the racial discrimination
allegations lodged against the company.167 That same year, Denny’s parent, Flagstar, reported a
staggering loss of $1.72 billion, or $40.93 a share, on revenue of $3.97 billion.168 Given its
severe financial troubles, it is difficult to assess the effect the lawsuits may have had on the
company’s stock price, and indeed, the stock price appears not to have been affected by either
the filings, or the settlement, of the lawsuits.169
Two other important facts contributed to Denny’s desire to resolve the suits and reform
its image. Perhaps the most critical fact was that Denny’s Chairman, Jerry Richardson, a former
football star in the 1950s, was seeking to establish a new NFL franchise in Charlotte, North
Carolina, and the bias allegations were seen as a threat to his efforts.170 Additionally, the
lawsuits arose during the Rodney King trials, a time when the country was acutely aware of the
persistence of a racial divide many had wished away years earlier. As a result, the company
moved quickly to stem the damage from the mountain of allegations and did so on a number of
fronts.
Rather than settling the cases, the company’s first move was to begin negotiating an
agreement with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”),
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that would conspicuously and tangibly promote minority interests. The NAACP was not a party
to any of the lawsuits but for a decade had encouraged corporations to enter into voluntary “Fair
Share” agreements as a way of demonstrating a company’s commitment to diversity.171
Negotiations over the NAACP Fair Share agreement began shortly after the original complaints
were filed and nearly 18 months before they were finally settled.172 There was, in fact, some
sense among the parties to the lawsuits that Denny’s sought to use the Fair Share agreement,
along with the nonmonetary Justice Department consent decree, to fend off further settlement
negotiations.173
The terms of the NAACP Fair Share agreement (“NAACP Pact”), signed on July
1, 1993, surpassed all of the previous 65 agreements the NAACP had negotiated.174 The NAACP
Pact was said to be worth more than $1 billion to minority businesses and interests, and
established specific goals and time frames, for the company to meet.175 As part of the agreement,
Flagstar promised to maintain employment of African Americans at the then current level of
20% or higher; to double the number of minority-owned restaurants by 1997, to hire 325 more
African-American restaurant and corporate managers earning annual salaries in excess of
$42,000, and to increase purchases from minority-owned firms from 2% to 12% of its
discretionary budget by the year 2000.1 7 6 At the time of the agreement, only 54 of Denny’s
1,485 (3.7%) restaurants were minority-owned, and only one of those was owned by an African
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American.177 A less savory part of the agreement was the NAACP’s explicit support for Jerry
Richardson’s bid to obtain an NFL franchise.178 As will be detailed shortly, Denny’s has met or
exceeded all of the goals established in the Fair Share agreement, including the acquisition of an
NFL franchise.
While the company was negotiating the Fair Share pact, the litigation was proceeding and
the evidence was mounting, including evidence that discrimination against African Americans
had been known, tolerated and perhaps encouraged by the corporate office.179 Nevertheless, the
truth of the allegations began to fade in importance as Denny’s quickly became the nation’s icon
of racial bigotry, an image that was likely to further erode its financial condition given that
members of minority groups made up approximately ten percent of its customer base, accounting
for more than $150 million in annual revenue.180
Shortly after the Fair Share agreement was signed, the company moved to settle the
lawsuits, focusing on the class action cases that had drawn the most attention. On May 23, 1994,
after a federal judge had consolidated several of the cases, the two class actions, and one other
complaint, were settled for a total of $54.4 million, the highest settlement ever obtained in a
public accommodations case.181 The settlement included $34.8 million for the California case,
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including $6.8 million (19.5%) in attorneys’ fees, while the nationwide class-action filed by the
six secret service agents received a monetary award of $19.6 million, including $1.9 million
(9.6%) in attorneys’ fees.182 When the settlements were distributed approximately a year later,
more than 290,000 individuals received checks for either $177.71 or $132.28, depending on
which case they were part of.183
The consent decrees, along with the separate decree entered into with the Justice
Department, concentrated on the public accommodations’ aspect of the cases, and required a
variety of non-discrimination language and training, as well as a requirement that thirty-percent
of Denny’s promotional materials include individuals who were identifiably non-white.184 The
decrees also required the creation of an Office of the Civil Rights Monitor (“OCRM”) to serve as
the legal entity responsible for ensuring that Denny’s complied with the consent decree. The
OCRM was empowered to send testers into Denny’s restaurants to monitor for discriminatory
behavior in violation of the consent decree, to receive and act on all complaints concerning
behavior at Denny’s from anywhere in the country, and to have the authority to require Denny’s
to cooperate in any of OCRM’s discretionary investigations.185
2. Denny’s Reform Efforts.
The company moved quickly to comply with the terms of the agreements, and to repair
its broken image. In 1994, Flagstar made 124 new minority hires in management and executive
positions — 103 of which were African American — and named its first African-American
member to its board of directors, as well as its first African-American executive, the Vice
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President for Human Resources. Denny’s increased the African Americans in its management
ranks by 56% over the previous year, and by the end of 1994, 13% of its employees were
African American. Flagstar also entered into new contracts with 19 minority suppliers,
including 14 black-owned firms, representing $21.3 million worth of business a year, equivalent
to 3.5% of the corporation’s purchases. The company negotiated a number of Denny’s franchise
agreements that would ultimately result in seven new black owners operating 32 restaurants,
although by the end of the year the company had actually closed its only African-Americanowned franchise.186 The company also exceeded its goal of $100,000 in charitable contributions
to civil rights groups, and established a pilot program at South Seattle Community college to
provide training for minority students in a culinary-arts program.187
In 1995, Denny’s increased its percentage of African-American managers and executives
from 7 to 12%, and its minority contracts increased five-fold over 1993 levels to $50 million.188
The same year, Denny’s initiated a diversity training program for all of its 50,000 Denny’s
employees to be completed within one year, and sought to improve its image through a $5
million series of television and print advertisements intended to convey a message welcoming
back their African-American clientele. Along the same lines, the company became a primary
sponsor for Soul Train, contributing $500,000 for its 25th anniversary television special,189 as
well as the Harlem Globetrotter basketball team.190 Flagstar also announced a major leadership
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change, as Jerry Richardson resigned as Chairman of the corporation to devote all of his time to
the ownership of his new football franchise, the Charlotte Panthers.191
Richardson was replaced by Jim Adamson, who has been widely acclaimed for moving
the company forward on diversity issues. His motto was simple and repeated wherever he went,
“If you discriminate, I will fire you.” To make good on his promise, the company began to
include provisions in its franchisee contracts that provided for termination if the franchisee “put
the [Denny’s] brand at risk.” By November 2, 1995, Denny’s had dropped a California
franchisee for customer discrimination, and had also fired a number of its managers, including
the manager of the restaurant that had denied service to the Secret Service agents.192 In contrast
to the stick of termination, Adamson provided a carrot to Denny’s management by tying 20% of
Denny’s managers’ bonuses to the reduction in the number of discrimination complaints the
company received.193
In 1996, Denny’s secured additional franchise agreements, bringing the total of AfricanAmerican owned frachises to 27, out of 653 franchises nationwide (4.1%).194 At the close of
1996, minority-purchasing contracts exceeded $80 million — an eight- fold increase since
1993.195 As a result of Denny’s progress, the NAACP named Jim Adamson its 1996 “CEO of
the Year.”196 The award, however, was perhaps bittersweet as it arrived while the company was
in the midst of its most dire financial straits, including a Chapter 11 filing for bankruptcy
protection and reorganization under the name Advantica.197
Despite its financial difficulties, Denny’s remained steadfast in its commitment to
meeting the terms of the Fair Share agreement. In 1998, when Fortune magazine published its
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first list of the “Best 50 Companies for Asians, Blacks, and Hispanics,” to work, Advantica
placed second – a remarkable turnaround from just five years earlier when Denny’s had been the
national symbol of corporate racism. 198 At the time of the report, nearly 33.3% of Advantica
officers and managers were minorities, and 35% of the 748 Denny’s franchises nationwide were
minority-owned, of which 109 franchises, or 14.5%, were African-American owned.199 Yet, the
diversity initiatives were not enough to salvage the company’s financial condition, and in the
middle of a a booming stock market, Advantica’s stock price dropped 69%.200 The company
dropped to sixth on the Fortune list in 1999, but by 2000 it had climbed to the top of the list,
where it remained in 2001.201 It is worth noting that, despite its efforts, Texaco has never made
the Fortune list.
The company’s continued transformation can be seen in the latest statistics. Four of its
eleven board of directors are minorities, as are 31.1% of its officials and managers and 48.0% of
its employees, with the largest share consisting of Latinos who make up about a third of the
workforce while African Americans comprise 11%.202 Approximately 19% of the company’s
contracts for services went to minority-owned businesses,203 and 37% of all Denny’s franchise
restaurants are now owned by minority
franchisees,2 0 4 <http://ww w.denn ys.com /who/p hilosoph ymain .html> . Collectively, 102 minority franchisees owned
321 Den ny’s restaurants; 123 of these were ow ned by A frican Am ericans.

with 123 of these franchises

owned by African Americans. Two companies, however, own a majority of those franchises.205
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All of these figures exceed the goals originally established by the Fair Share agreement, and
have garnered the company a bevy of awards beyond the recognition from Fortune magazine.206
The story, however, does not yet have a happy ending, as Denny’s continues to struggle
financially and has not been able to shake its tattered image. Despite record sales of more than
$2 billion, the company was recently delisted by the Over-the-Counter exchange where it had
previously traded, and now trades for about $1 on the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board.207 Nor
has the company’s transformation stemmed the tide of lawsuits, as Denny’s remains plagued by
suits alleging discriminatory service, including a high-profile lawsuit filed by Syracuse
University students that, although ultimately dismissed, generated a new round of adverse
publicity.208 It would certainly be too much to suggest that the company’s diversity efforts
caused, or even contributed, to its financial slide, but it appears that, at least in this instance,
although diversity may have been good for business it has not been good enough.
IV. THE BENEFITS AND EFFECTS OF CLASS ACTION LITIGATION.
The case studies together with the statistical study offer important insights into
how class action employment discrimination has changed, particularly over the last decade as the
litigation has become more like a common tort and less like a traditional civil rights action. As
discussed in more detail below, this is perhaps most evident in the relief that is now commonly
afforded the plaintiff class, where monetary damages, often at minimal levels when calculated on
an individual basis, constitute the primary, and frequently the only, relief intended to compensate
for past discrimination. The lawsuits rarely require corporations to modify their existing
practices, and whatever changes occur tend to be a product of the corporation’s own interests,
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often driven by public relations concerns rather than the requirements of a consent decree. This
is likely one reason why neither the lawsuits nor the settlements tend to affect shareholder value
in any meaningful way.
Even though the nature of the litigation has substantially changed, this study suggests
that the nature of discrimination identified in the subset of class action cases studied here has
surprisingly stayed much the same. At least with respect to systemic discrimination challenged
by class action litigation, the kind of discrimination that is most likely to catch th\e public eye
remains overt racial discrimination, along the lines of Texaco and Denny’s, the kind of
discrimination that resembles old line discrimination that we would like to believe is part of our
past rather than our present. The gender discrimination cases evince a similar pattern by
continuing to focus on discriminatory assignments of women to undesirable jobs based on
stereotypical perceptions of their interests, the very kind of discrimination that has been at the
heart of sex discrimination litigation for the past thirty years.209
These insights raise an important question regarding the social utility of the class action
litigation. Discrimination litigation has always had the twin purposes of remedying past
discrimination while deterring future discrimination, and in this section I will explore both of
these issues by analyzing the effect the lawsuits have had on corporations and on the plaintiff
classes, as well as the role played by the other actors in the process, namely the attorneys, the
new diversity task forces and the government. I will suggest that the turn to large damage
awards as the primary remedial tool has diminished both the public nature and the efficacy of the
litigation. In the last section, I will discuss some possible reforms that might return a public
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interest dimension to the class action litigation with an eye toward serving the underlying
purposes of the law. These reforms will include raising the damages to increase the deterrent
effect of antidiscrimination litigation and providing a monitoring function to ensure that the
settlement serves the interests of the class and is implemented faithfully.
A. The Plaintiffs: Do they Come Out Ahead?
The benefits that accrue to the plaintiff class comprise an important measure of the effect
of class action litigation. The basic remedial principle underlying Title VII has always been to
place the injured party in the position she would have been in absent the discrimination.210 Prior
to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, when damages were not available for claims filed
under Title VII, successful class action plaintiffs were typically afforded some monetary relief in
the form of their lost wages, as well as other injunctive relief designed to alter the employer’s
discriminatory practices.211 Many of the pre-1991 Act cases involved discriminatory tests, so
often the settlements required the employer to design new tests that had less of a discriminatory
impact.212 The remedial relief might also provide a preference to victims of discrimination in
future hiring or promotions, so as to place them in the position they would have been in had they
not been discriminated against, and goals and timetables were also common in settlement
agreements.213 In these cases, relief was generally reserved to individuals who could establish a
valid claim of discrimination based on a defined procedure. Determining who was eligible for
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the relief has always been a burdensome task, and at least with respect to monetary relief, the
burden on the party seeking relief has often been minimal, such as establishing that he or she had
applied during a particular time period and was not disqualified from the position for some
nondiscriminatory reason. The standards, however, were often more stringent for obtaining a
job or promotion.214

1. Structural Reforms in the Post-Civil Rights Act

of 1991 Era.
The post-Civil Rights Act of 1991 cases have a distinctly different focus. Monetary
relief now forms the core of the remedial package, and beyond the monetary relief there is little
attempt to remedy past discrimination. This is true of the cases studied earlier: neither Texaco
nor Home Depot offered any specific jobs to members of the plaintiff class nor did either case
require any particular changes in the employers’ practices.215 Instead, the companies themselves,
and in Texaco under the auspices of its Diversity Task Force, were charged with studying their
practices to determine what changes were necessary. In both cases, the companies ultimately
hired more women and minorities but there was no effort to offer jobs to those who might have
been discriminated against in the past, nor was there any specific effort to make up for the past
years of discriminatory hiring or promotions. At most the companies appeared to stop
discriminating without remedying, other than through monetary relief, their past
discrimination.216 Other lawsuits demonstrate similar characteristics. The case against CocaCola is modeled on the Texaco litigation, and no specific changes in the corporation’s practices
214
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were required under the terms of the consent decree.217 The extensive litigation against grocery
store chains, all of which were initiated by the firm that was primarily responsible for the Home
Depot case, did not require any specific changes in employment practices, and indeed, the
companies have typically refused to provide any information about their employment practices,
or workforce statistics, even after the case settled.
The two cases in which reform did occur — Shoney’s and State Farm — were both filed
before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the Shoney’s case was initially
prosecuted by a non-profit public interest group, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education
Fund.218 The State Farm case, which for many years was the largest employment discrimination
settlement, resulted in large monetary awards to class members of approximately $190,000 and
also required that at least fifty percent of new agents had to be women.219
This shift in remedial focus from structural change to monetary relief highlights one of
the central ways in which employment discrimination class action litigation has become just
another tort. In the analogous tort area of products liability, money damages are the primary
remedy for past injury and defendants are not required by the terms of the settlement to change
their practices, nor does the plaintiff have an ongoing monitoring role once the lawsuit has
ended.220 Whatever changes the company implements are self-initiated to limit its exposure to
additional lawsuits, and it is the cost of additional accidents or injuries that provides the
incentive to alter corporate practices. This also means that, like accidents, discrimination has
now become part of the cost of doing business, and as a society, it appears that we no longer
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desire to eradicate discrimination but instead have placed a price on discrimination that
effectively assumes discrimination will persist.221 Although the change has largely gone
unnoticed, this represents a sea change in the way we think about discrimination, and is, in many
ways, consistent with Derrick Bell’s emphasis on the permanence of discrimination.222
2. Monetary Relief.
Assessing the effect of the shift in remedial focus, requires analyzing the monetary relief
that is provided to plaintiffs as part of the settlements. Even though as a society we may not
want to condone the persistence of discrimination, in our imperfect world we may accept a
tradeoff between structural reforms and monetary relief if that tradeoff provides the best
prospects for antidiscrimination enforcement, particularly if the monetary relief is substantial.
Many plaintiffs would undoubtedly prefer money damages to the prospect of a job or a
promotion, especially when they have already located alternative employment.
All of the cases discussed in this study, including those in the statistical study, settled for
substantial financial amounts — awards that generally far exceed what had been obtained prior
to the enactment of the new damage provisions as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. But the
amounts that are reported by the parties are often misleading in that they represent the
defendants’ maximum possible exposure, typically spread across a multi-year timeframe and
often exceed what the defendant will actually pay out. When the settlement amounts are
reported, they generally include the money that will be distributed to the plaintiff class, as well
as attorneys’ fees, third-party expenditures on diversity efforts and minority suppliers, and other
potential costs that may never be realized, such as the potential costs of raising salaries should a
study determine that past practices in setting salaries were discriminatory.
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As set forth in Table 5 below [place near here], the recent Coca-Cola settlement
illustrates how settlement amounts can be inflated to overrepresent its value to the plaintiff class.
The Coca-Cola settlement was routinely reported to be worth $192.5 million.223 Of that amount,
$58.7 million was set aside for compensatory damages, which were defined as compensating
emotional distress, hostile environment discrimination and other non-wage discrimination.224
There is also a $24.1 million back pay fund to compensate for lost wages due to discriminatory
policies, some of which would be paid in stock options.225 The remaining monetary amounts
were less well defined. The ten million dollar Promotional Achievement fund would be awarded
to those African Americans promoted over the next ten years into positions where African
Americans had been previously underutilized.226 A pay equity fund in the amount of $43.5
million, nearly twice the size of the back pay fund, would be paid out over ten years to remedy
pay disparities that were identified by statistical experts. The amount of the pay equity fund was
an estimate, and the amounts actually distributed could be far lower, as occurred in the Texaco
case.227 The total defined in the settlement approved by the court amounts to $156 million, and
the remaining $36 million was dedicated to various diversity initiatives, many of which the
company likely would have implemented even without the settlement. This was especially true
in the case of Coca-Cola, which even prior to the lawsuit had contributed millions of dollars to
African-American groups and had a strong reputation within the civil rights community.228 The
attorneys’ fees accounted for an additional $20.6 million, or 20% of the total funds dedicated for
compensation to the plaintiff class and the attorneys. While this amount is again considerably
223
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lower than the standard one-third contigency, the Coca-Cola case was settled within a year of the
initial filing and no substantial motions were ever filed.229 By the attorneys’ own estimates, the
fee award was between three and four times their actual fees.230 As a percentage of the total
settlement, only about 43% of the amount would go directly to the plaintiffs, with another $53.5
million, or 28%, contingent on future events.
Even when broken down by its components, the Coca-Cola settlement provided
substantial payoffs to the plaintiffs, which in this instance amounted to an average payment
estimated to be $38,000 per class member.231 While the average payments are often based on
estimates of the potential class size, they provide one of the best measures of the benefits that
ultimately redound to class members. Table Six [place near here] provides a representative
sampling of settlements based on the various amounts that were distributed to the individual
class members, and the attorneys. The “Amount for Class” category includes only those
payments designated for the class, excluding attorneys fees, payments on diversity initiatives,
and possible payments to class members that were contingent on future events. The average
payments are based on reported estimates for non-class representatives and vary widely from a
high of $63,000 in the Texaco case to a low of $840 in the sex discrimination case involving
Publix Markets.232 Only two of the cases provided an average payment in excess of $20,000 and
the median award was $9,683 obtained in the Home Depot case. In many of the cases, the class
representatives received far higher payments, including as much as $300,000 in the Coca-Cola
litigation.233
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There w ere, how ever, a nu mber o f significan t discovery disputes. See Abdallah v. Coca-Cola Co., 186
F.R.D. 672 (N.D. GA 1999) (dispute regarding interviews of prospective class members); Abdallah v. CocaCola Co ., No. 1:98 CV36 79-RW S, 1999 WL 5 27740 (N.D. G a. 1999 ) (motion for protec tive order ).
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Ingram v. Coca-Cola, 200 F.R.D. 685, 696 (N.D. GA 2001) (“Counsel estimate that the time expended
results in a lodestar amount for this case of between $5.2 and $6 million.”).
231
See Henry Unger , Coca-Cola Soon to Mail Class Action Checks, A T L A N T A J. & C ONST ., July 12, 2001,
at 1E (estimating the average check at $38,000).
232
See Allen M yerson, supra note 2, at A8 (“The women will divide $63.5 million, generally receiving
from $ 70 to $8 40, dep ending on their ex perience at Publix . . . “).
233
See Betsy M cKay, Coca-Cola Agrees to Settle Bias Suit for $192.5 Million, W ALL S TREET J., Nov. 17,
2000, at A3 (“The four plaintiffs who filed the lawsuit . . . will receive an award of no more than $300,000
each . . .”).
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Given that these lawsuits primarily produce monetary relief for class members, a
substantial question exists as to whether these payouts render the cases socially valuable or
whether they should be seen as modest wealth transfers between the defendants and the plaintiffs
and their attorneys. Professor Bill Rubenstein has recently suggested that class action litigation
has become less adversarial and more transactional in nature, with the transaction involving the
sale of the plaintiffs’ rights to sue.234 Employment discrimination class actions provide
additional support for his thesis, with the important caveat that in addition to buying the
plaintiffs’ right to sue, the defendants are also required to cease their discriminatory practices, at
least to the extent those practices can be identified.
Table Six (place near here) also provides information on the attorneys’ fees obtained in
the cases, including the percentage of the total amounts paid to the class and the attorneys.
Without question, the attorneys for the plaintiff classes receive a substantial portion of the wealth
transfer. Yet, even though the fees tend to be extremely high in absolute terms, as a percentage
of the recovery most of the awards fall well within the accepted range of 20-30% for class action
litigation,235 and all but two fall well below the standard one-third contingency fee. It is
interesting that the two smallest damage awards produced the two highest fee awards as a
percentage of the recovery, perhaps suggesting that attorneys seek a minimum fee independent
of the underlying monetary awards.
3. Diversity Initiatives.
In the new era of employment discrimination litigation, neither monetary relief nor
structural reform exhausts the terms of the agreements. Rather, as part of the settlements,
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See William B. Rube nstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 G EO . L.J. 371, 419 (2001) (“The
core premise of the transactional model is that complex multiparty litigation resembles a transaction more
than it resembles a conventional adversarial lawsuit. What is bought and sold are rights-to-sue.”).
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See D E B O R A H R. H E N S L E R E T A L., C LASS A C T I O N D I L E M M A S: P U R S U I N G P UBLIC G OALS FOR P RIVATE
G A I N S 78 (2000) (“The most widely cited standard [for fees in class actions] is 25-30%.”; Russ M. Herman,
Percentage-of-Benefit Fee Awards in Common Fund C ases, 74 T ULANE L. R EV . 2033, 2038 n.51 (2000)
(noting that most common fee is 20-30% of class action settlement fund). One study estimated that
attorneys ’ fees in secu rities class action s average 26.8% of the settlem ent fund . See Janet Cooper
Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 ST A N . L. R EV . 497,
573 (1991).
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employers now commonly engage in a variety of diversity initiatives, ranging from increasing
their commitments to minority suppliers to diversity training for their employees. Companies
have also agreed to contribute funds to colleges or other public interest groups, and sponsored
minority groups such as the Harlem Globetrotters or a black circus.236 Virtually every settlement
now requires some form of diversity initiative, and these efforts can add significantly to the cost
of the settlement. This was certainly true for the Texaco and Denny’s litigations where the
companies directed millions of dollars to women and minority suppliers, and likewise
comprised a substantial portion of the total settlement amount in the cases involving Coca-Cola
and Shoney’s. In a recent settlement involving the Boeing Company, the amount the company
agreed to devote to unspecified affirmative action efforts was nearly half as large as the amount
dedicated to the class.237
These diversity initiatives raise a number of troubling concerns, not the least of which is
their value to the plaintiff class. Diversity training is now commonplace in corporate America
and it is quite likely that the costs attributed to the settlement for diversity training are simply
costs the employer would have incurred even if it had not been sued. It is estimated that more
than seventy percent of large corporations have initiated diversity training in the last decade,238
and most of those that have not yet instituted some form of training are expected to do so in the
near future. Even though diversity training is now a standard business practice, its benefits
remain largely speculative, as there has been sparse empirical evidence to document its value.239
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See supra text accompanying notes 189-90.
The settlement involving Boeing provided for $6.65 million to class members and $3.65 million for
diversity ef forts. See Settlemen t is Approv ed in Bo eing Bia s Lawsu it, N.Y. T IMES , Oct. 10, 1 999, at C 20.
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See E L I Z A BE T H L ASCH -Q U I N N, R ACE E XPERTS : H O W R ACIAL E TIQUETTE S E N S I TI V I TY T R A I N IN G A N D
N E W A GE T H E R A P Y H IJACKED THE C IVIL R IGHTS R E V O L U T IO N 163 (2001) (estimating that 70% of Fortune
500 compan ies adopted diversity training by 1995).
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Professor Susan B isom-R app rece ntly review ed the ex isting literature a nd con cluded th at there wa s little
suppor t for the ben eficial effects o f diversity tra ining. See Susan B isom-R app, An Oun ce of Prevention is a
Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and
Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BE R K E L EY J. OF E M P . A N D L ABOR L. 1 (20 01).
Professor Bisom-Rapp concludes, “The empirical and anecdotal evidence discussed in the last section
renders th e legal pro fession’s re flexive an d undisc erning en dorsem ent of anti-d iscrimina tion training highly
suspect. W hile the des ire to find a “ quick fix ” for the p roblem of emp loyme nt discrim ination is
understandable, that educational efforts positively affect entrenched bias is a hypothesis that has yet to be
proven.” Id. at 44. See also Mark B endick, Jr ., Mary L ou Eg an & S uzann e M. Lo fhjelm, Workforce
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The diversity industry itself, an unregulated amorphous collection of groups, has come under
sharp criticism for the lack of validation for its programs.240 At a minimum, it seems safe to
conclude that diversity training is a poor substitute for structural reform.
No doubt the popularity of diversity initiatives in settlement agreements is attributable to
the benefits they provide to employers rather than employees. This is particularly true of the
third-party transfer payments. While the employees may gain some value from the increased use
of minority suppliers or advertisers, the promotion of a circus or a basketball team, the
employers use these efforts as important public relations tools. This is not to suggest that these
expenditures are undesirable, only that they should not be counted as an unqualified benefit to
the plaintiff class, especially if the money that is distributed to third parties could have been
available to the plaintiffs.
B.

Corporations and Class Action Litigation.

Even if the benefits to the plaintiff class are modest, class action litigation may still be
socially beneficial to the extent it alters corporate practices to prevent and eradicate
discrimination. This may occur in several distinct ways – through reforms the suits prompt,
through the market reaction by investors, or by deterring employers from discriminatory
practices. As already touched on, and discussed in more detail below, the fact that the lawsuits
do not significantly affect shareholder value suggests they have a limited deterrent effect. Other
factors, such as the presence of insurance and the apparent random quality of the lawsuits,
likewise suggest that the litigation will offer limited prospects for deterrence. This section will
explore what this study tells us about the effect the lawsuits have had on corporations, and about

Diversity Training: From Anti-Discrimination Compliance to Organ. Development, 24 H U M A N R ESOURCE
P L A N N I N G 10, 12 (2 001) (id entifying only two studies desig ned to m easure the efficacy o f diversity
training).
240
For two extensive critiques of the industry see LASCH -Q U I N N, supra note 238, F R E D E R IC K R. L YNCH ,
T HE D I V E R SI T Y M A C H I N E: T HE D R I V E TO C HANGE THE W HITE M ALE W ORKPLACE (1997). Altho ugh these
critiques are hardly models of objectivity, their descriptions of the evolution of the diversity industry are
valuable and expose its lack of a theoretical foundation.
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the continuing presence of discrimination.

1. The Nature of Discrimination and

its Reform.
Before analyzing the deterrent effects of the lawsuits, it is worth exploring what these
lawsuits reveal about the nature of contemporary discrimination because understanding the
nature of that discrimination will enable us to better define the effect the litigation has had over
the last several decades. One of the surprising conclusions of this study is just how little has
changed. While institutional discrimination has unquestionably receded in the last two decades,
the cases discussed in this study all involve allegations of discrimination that implicate policies
that resemble those of an earlier era, whether those policies involve overt racial animus or sexstereotyping. Indeed, all of the cases that have received widespread attention in the last decade
have involved allegations of overt claims of intentional discrimination.
Both Texaco and Denny’s, as well as the case against Shoney’s, involved classic cases of
overt racial discrimination, complete with racial epithets, code words, and the Ku Klux Klan.
Not coincidentally, the cases against Denny’s and Texaco, and to a lesser extent Shoney’s, are
the only cases that captured any sustained national attention during the last decade, and they did
so based on what appeared to be evidence of discrimination from a bygone era – racial epithets
on a secretly recorded tape and the refusal to serve black secret service agents attired in their
dress uniforms.241 The case against Shoney’s involved explicit directives from the company to
keep African-American workers out of the dining room, as well as allegations that the Chief
Executive Officer at one time supported the Ku Klux Klan and offered to match his employees’
contributions to that organization.242 Both Shoney’s and Denny’s, as well as many of the other
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See text accom panyin g notes 6 7-69 (T exaco) a nd 164 (Denn y’s), supra.
It was reported that Shoney’s former Chairman, Raymond L. Danner, had once offered to match any
emplo yee’s con tributions to the Ku K lux Klan . See Ronald Smothers , $105 M illion Poo rer Now , Chain
Mends Race Policies, N.Y. T IMES , Jan. 31, 19 93, at A1 6.
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companies discussed in this study, were headquartered in the South, which gave the cases an
additional tie to the segregation-era cases.243
As noted previously, Denny’s and Shoney’s are two companies that have gone to great
lengths to actually change their cultures, and Texaco has also gone to considerable length to
change its image. One lesson to be drawn from these cases is that allegations of race
discrimination, particularly those steeped in intentional discriminatory practices, still resonate far
more than any other claim of discrimination. Indeed, our social norms have turned so strongly
against overt acts of racial discrimination that their effect persists even after the allegations turn
out not to be true, as in the Texaco case where the company settled even after the tapes were
found not be as racially charged as originally assumed.244 The case against Coca-Cola provides
another example of a company reacting quickly to the public perception that it was riddled with
racially discriminatory practices.245 Yet, these efforts are not always successful. Despite its
substantial reform efforts, Denny’s has been unable to shake its stained image and for much of
the public continues to be deeply associated with its past discriminatory actions.246
The sex discrimination cases provide a sharp contrast to the continued salience of race
discrimination. Home Depot, and here one can substitute any of the similar sex discrimination
cases against the grocery industry, never garnered much attention, never faced a boycott of its
stores, and as a result, made only the changes it was previously planning to implement leaving it
difficult to conclude that the company has transformed its male-dominated culture at all.
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Denny’s was headq uarted in South Carolina, while Shoney’s was hea dquarted in Tennessee. In
addition, Home Depot and Coca-Cola were both headquarted in Atlanta, Winn Dixie and Publix in Florida,
Wal-M art in Ark ansas, and Texaco had sub stantial oper ations in T exas.
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See supra text accompanying note 77.
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See Davan Maha raj, Coca-C ola to Settle R acial Bia s Lawsu it: Soft Drink Giant A grees to P ay $19 2.5
Million Over Allegations it Treats Blacks Unfairly, L.A. T IMES , Nov. 17, 2000, at A1.
246
In one recent case , the Sixth Circuit Cou rt of Appeals effective ly took judicial notice o f Denny’s p ast
history, noting, “Defendant’s past history of discriminatory conduct, both to its minority patrons and
employees alike, is well known in the jurisprudence and public forums.” Logan v. Denny’s Inc, 259 F.3d
558, 577 (6 th Cir. 2001). The court’s reference to Denny’s history elicited a stern rebuke from a dissenting
judge, “Even more disturbing . . . is the majority opinion’s reference to articles from the news media and the
purported litigation history of Denny’s restaurant to increase the burden upon defendants . . .” Id. at 582.
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Evidence from the series of lawsuits involving grocery stores also indicates that the industry has
remained resilient to change, as women continue to be seriously underrepresented at the
management level and two studies recently identified the grocery industry as leading industry for
discrimination against women.247
The fact that so many of the cases filed during the last decade have involved traditional
claims of intentional discrimination is contrary to the prevailing view on the nature of
contemporary discrimination. There has long been an assumption that overt forms of
discrimination have been displaced by more subtle forms, what have been aptly described as
“second-order” discrimination.248 This may be true of individual cases of discrimination, and
may also be true of most forms of systemic discrimination, but the cases discussed in this study
demonstrates that there remains a substantial level of overt intentional discrimination. The
major class action cases that have arisen over the last decade are not about discriminatory
promotion tests or practices, or even glass ceilings, but more often involve subjective
employment practices that created distinct patterns of segregated jobs, largely based on
traditional stereotypes regarding the abilities and interests of women and minorities.249 For the
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See Stuart Silve rstein, In Supermarkets’ Executive Department A Lack of Variety, L.A. T IMES , May 2,
1999, at C1. It also appears that in general the grocery stores have not been hurt despite the bevy of
lawsuits aim ed at the ind ustry. For o ne analy sis see Mich ael Sasso, Discrimination Lawsuits Haven’t
Deterred Sho ppers, T HE L EDGER , Jan. 21, 20 01, at E1 (“[I]n the th ree mo nths follow ing the settlem ent . . .
Publix’s sa les were ac tually up a bout 9 p ercent fro m the sam e three m onths in 1 996. M eanwh ile, profits
were up 22 perc ent over th e same q uarter in 19 96.”).
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See Sturm, supra note 151 at 46 8-74 (describin g second ge neration discrimin ation). In the mid-1 980s,
Charles Lawrence wrote an influential article describing how racial discrimination was more commonly the
produ ct of unco nscious fo rces rather th an over t, animus -based d iscrimina tion. See Charles L awrenc e, III.,
The Id, The E go, and E qual Protection : Reckoning with Uncon scious Racism , 39 ST A N . L. R EV . 317 (19 87).
In my own w ork, I hav e likewise d escribed h ow discr imination has beco me m ore subtle in nature. See
Micha el Selmi, Proving Intention al Discrim ination: T he Rea lity of Supre me Co urt Rheto ric, 86 G EO . L.J.
279, 290 (1997) (“Following the passage of the historic Civil Rights Acts in the mid-1960s, discrimination
began to take on new and more subtle forms, and overt or blatant racial classifications gradually became the
exceptio n rather tha n the rule in legal challen ges . . .”).
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The case s involvin g superm arkets hav e all raised ne arly identic al claims. See, e.g., Christine Blank,
Ingles H it by Class-A ction Sex Bias Suit , S UPERMARKET N E W S, Mar. 9, 1998 , at 4 (“The suit . . . allege[s]
that wom en are releg ated to cash ier, clerk, deli, an d baker y position s . . .”); Allen R. M yerson, Supermarket
Chain to Pay $8 1 Million to Settle Bia s Suit, N.Y. T IMES , Jan. 25, 1997, at A1 (“The discrimination suit was
filed . . . by 12 women who said they were concentrated at the cash registers, while men sold and stocked
the mer chand ise – position s with m ore poten tial for adva ncem ent.”); Kry sten Craw ford, Barnhart v.
Safeway, T HE R ECORDER , April 6, 1994, at 2 (the plaintiffs “alleged Safeway consistently overlooked
wom en whe n mak ing ma nagem ent prom otions, assig ned them to lower- paying jobs in the d eli or bake ry . . .
“); Jane Gross, Big Grocery Chain Reaches Landmark Sex-Bias Accord, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1993, at A1
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most part, there was nothing subtle, or novel, about the discrimination alleged in any of these
cases but instead they all raised familiar claims and arguments. As noted earlier, Texaco,
Denny’s and Shoney’s all involved explicit claims of racial discrimination, and another case that
grabbed national headlines involving Mitsubishi included explicit and pervasive sexual
harassment. The case against Publix markets involved all of the classic forms of sex
stereotyping ranging from women’s lack of interest in working long hours to men’s need for
higher salaries to care for their families.250
At the same time, because none of the cases was tried, it is difficult to know whether the
cases targeted actual patterns of discrimination, or at least what the law would define as unlawful
discrimination. All of the cases identified statistical imbalances in the workforces, but a
statistical imbalance by itself is rarely sufficient to establish a defendant’s liability.251 The three
case studies provide mixed evidence of discrimination. In Texaco, the primary allegations
involving salary and promotion discrimination were not substantiated based on the salary studies
conducted under the terms of the settlement agreement and reinforced by the company’s
subsequent promotion patterns.252 Home Depot appears to provide a stronger case of
discrimination in its assignment policy, but this is also the kind of claim that courts have not
been especially receptive to over the years, largely because of their own stereotypical biases

(“The women said they were channeled into dead-end jobs, either working the cash registers or in the
relatively n ew dep artmen ts like bake ries and d elicatessens . . .”).
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For an ex tensive an alysis of the P ublix case see Ann e Hull, A Woman’s Place , S T . P E T E R SB U R G T IMES ,
Feb. 2, 1997, at 1A.. The statistical basis for the promotional claims at issue in Publix was gathered by
walking into the store to observ e the pictur es of the M anagers and As sistant Ma nagers th at were h anging in
the stores, m ore than n inety perc ent of wh om w ere white men. Id. at 8A. The case included allegations of
widespread harassment, overt statements of paying men more because of their family responsibilities, and
many cases of w omen who w ere denie d oppo rtunities read ily available to men . See id.
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Most of the cases were premised on a theory of intentional discrimination that resulted from a pattern or
practice of discrimination. In these cases, statistics alone can be used to establish a prima facie case of
discrimin ation, and statistics genera lly provid e the substa nce of the claim. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist v.
United States, 435 U.S. 299, 314 (1977) (“where gross disparities can be shown, they alone may in a proper
case constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination.”). The defendant is then
afforded an opportunity to either rebut the statistics or to offer an alternative explanation for the observed
disparities. See id. at 318.
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See text accompanying notes 109-11 supra.
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regarding jobs that are appropriate for women.253 Yet, based on the plaintiffs’ statistical
evidence, it does seem that Home Depot engaged in a pattern of discriminatory conduct, and that
such conduct remains a surprisingly prominent part of the corporate landscape, particularly with
respect to what are treated as traditional male and female jobs. The case against Denny’s was
almost certainly the strongest of the cases studied here but because it focused on public
accommodations rather than employment it is difficult to draw any conclusions regarding
employment discrimination, other than to say that Denny’s was unquestionably capable of
substantially improving its record with respect to the hiring and promotion of minorities once it
made a concerted effort. The Shoney’s case, which in many ways parallels the case against
Denny’s also provides extensive evidence of systemic discrimination, in this instance by a
corporation with a culture permeated by discriminatory tastes.254
It may be that the nature of these cases reveals more about class action litigation than
they do about the nature of discrimination. One reason claims of overt discrimination continue
to predominate among the large class actions is that these claims have a substantially higher
probability of success than other forms of discrimination, which is a critical factor in attracting
the profit-motivated attorneys who currently bring the large class action cases. In contrast, cases
that involve subtle discrimination are far more difficult to prove, and often do not lend
themselves to class action treatment because they involve complicated issues of proof that may
be individualized. Claims premised solely on a disparate impact theory may also fail to attract
profit-motivated attorneys because only equitable relief, typically in the form of back pay, is
available in these cases.255 Traditionally, requiring defendants to pay attorney’s fees to
successful plaintiffs was intended to create an incentive for attorneys to pursue civil rights cases,
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I develop this argum ent in M ichael Selm i, Why are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?
61 L A . L. R EV . 555, 56 8-69 (2 001).
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See Lynn e Duke , Shoney’s Bias Settlement Sends $105 Million Signal, W ASH . P OST ., Feb. 5, 1993, at
A1 (noting that the company President “was so adamant about holding down the number of black
employees that manage rs hid blacks ‘from view’ when h e paid them visits . . .”).
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42 U.S.C . § 1981 a(a) (perm itting limited d amag es for “un lawful inte ntional disc riminatio n” while
specifically excluding “an employmen t practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact.”).
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including those involving employment discrimination that may not otherwise be financially
lucrative.256 However, as we saw earlier, attorneys in class action cases are today routinely
obtaining fee awards of three to five times their actual fees,257 which suggests that the statutory
fee provisions are unlikely to provide a comparable incentive.
What this means is that the difficult cases – those involving subtle discrimination or
disparate impact claims – are candidates either for government prosecution or non-profit publicinterest organizations, neither of which has been actively pursuing large class action claims over
the last decade. During this time, the government’s litigation behavior has been almost
comically inept. For example, the EEOC sought to intervene in the Texaco litigation only after
the tapes were revealed, and in fact, after the case was settled.258 The agency never sought to
intervene in the California Home Depot litigation, but instead sought intervention in the
relatively dormant Louisiana litigation, and its intervention became moot when the case settled
shortly after the California agreement was entered.259 And while the Justice Department
negotiated the first agreement with Denny’s, the government ultimately played no significant
role in transforming the company other than to insist on the creation of the Office of the Civil
Rights Monitor. Even in cases where the government was an active party, such as the case
against Publix Markets, it was always a secondary player that performed a limited role in the
litigation.260 As discussed below, the government’s failure to play an effective role has
contributed to the lack of public accountability among the current class action litigation.
2. The Deterrence Hypothesis: Do the Lawsuits Deter
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See Micha el Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s Role in Employment
Discrimination Law, 57 O H I O S T . L.J. 1, 27-32 (1996) (discussing incentives for private attorneys) .
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See Kurt Eic henw ald, Agency S eeks a Role in Te xaco Case , N.Y. T IMES , Nov. 21, 1995, at D4 (“A
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Texaco . . .”).
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See Kathleen Grimsle y, Hom e Depo t Settles Gen der Bias L awsuits , W ASH . P OST , Sept. 20, 1997, at D1
(noting that EEOC sough t to intervene in New Orleans case).
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There is an important exception. Although the case was begun by private attorneys, the sexual
harassment litigation against Mitsubishi was driven by the EEOC, which also required more extensive
reform s, and a co urt-appo inted Tas k Force , than hav e been re quired in many of the othe r cases.
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This study also raises an important question of whether our current system creates
adequate incentives to deter discrimination within the workplace. Although deterrence is one of
the central purposes of antidiscrimination law, for a variety of reasons it is ultimately difficult to
determine whether any form of litigation serves as an adequate deterrent. One important
limitation is that no system can attain perfect deterrence, if by perfect deterrence we mean that
all discriminators, but only discriminators, are deterred by the law. Rather, for any legal system
designed to deter socially undesirable conduct there will inevitably be either over or
underdeterrence, and as a matter of social policy, it will be necessary to choose between these
imperfect alternatives.261
In the context of antidiscrimination law, the choice may seem easy insofar as there is no
strong claim for a system that underdeters. Discrimination serves no positive social purpose,
and our national commitment has always been to eliminate rather than to reduce discrimination.
In this respect, we plainly ought to prefer overdeterrence to underdeterrence, and we may even
conclude that maximum deterrence would be optimal deterrrence.262 And yet, while we may
theoretically maintain a desire to eliminate discrimination at any cost, we know and expect
employers to make cost calculations in establishing their levels of care. We would not expect,
for example, a firm to overhaul its hiring practices if the cost of doing so would exceed the
firm’s potential liability, and as a result the costs of compliance are inevitably taken into account
in a firm’s profit-maximizing decisions.
A system that overdeters is not without its problems. To the extent that the
antidiscrimination litigation punish employers that are not engaging in discrimination, firms may
become overly cautious in their employment practices, which may manifest itself in various
261

See, e.g., Louis K aplow & Steven S havell, Fairness Versus W elfare, 114 H ARV . L. R EV . 961, 1262
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regard the probability of capture as very low, may not find the prospect of punishment very distasteful, or
may ac t in the heat o f the mo ment to pursue a higher p erceived gain.”). Fo r a genera l discussion on levels
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See Micha el Selmi, Old Whine, New Bottle: A Response to Professor Wax, 74 IN D . L.J. 1233, 1248
(1999 ) (arguing that as a socie ty we sho uld prefe r over to u nderde tterence).
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ways. In some cases, employers may be hesitant to hire African Americans or women so as to
avoid class action suits based on their employment practices.263 Alternatively, employers may
engage in quota hiring as a way of avoiding suits, as has long been alleged by opponents of
affirmative action,264 and they may also engage in inefficient employment practices by placing a
value on the avoidance of lawsuits ahead of other company interests. This may be particularly
true for mid-level managers who may suffer repercussions for the very visible lawsuits but not
for the less visible reduction in productivity that may result from emphasizing the avoidance of
litigation.
This overview demonstrates some of the difficulties in identifying an optimal deterrence
system but there remains the question whether the current system provides for socially desirable
levels of deterrence. In its most basic formulation, deterrence is a function of the probability of
detection and the likely penalty, which includes the prospect of the firm being held liable.265 As
a practical matter, this theoretical construct is of limited utility because an essential element of
the equation is invariably missing. Although the probability of detection is routinely discussed
as if it were measurable, the actuality is the likelihood of detection is never known because we
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practices h ave paled in impo rtance to th ose invo lving treatm ent of em ployees . See John J. Donohue, III &
Peter Sieg elman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 ST A N . L. R EV . 983,
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do not know how many firms escape detection. This problem is compounded by the present
study which fails to shed light on whether the lawsuits target actual discrimination, so not only is
there no way to quantify the number of firms that escape detection but we do not know how
many of the targeted firms were actually engaging in discriminatory conduct. This, too, may
limit the law’s deterrent effects. When lawsuits do not target actual discrimination, employers
may determine that their efforts to prevent discrimination will go unrewarded and would
therefore be wasteful. If a suit is as likely regardless of whether the company actually
discriminates, then there is little a company can do to stave off a lawsuit. As the authors of a
study on class action litigation recently concluded: “[W]henever the justice system rewards
litigation without regard to its legal or factual merit the deterrent potential of litigation is
squandered.”266
Even with these limitations, there is reason to believe that our current system is less than
socially optimal. As noted earlier, class action cases still comprise an insignificant portion of the
cases that are filed in any given year, amounting to only about seventy-five cases filed in federal
court annually, a level that is down substantially from those of a decade earlier.267 Based on the
paucity of class action filings, the probability of detection appears to be extremely low,268 and
when combined with the fact that the lawsuits may be opportunistically targeted rather than
designed to eradicate discrimination, it seems unlikely that firms face a serious deterrent threat
based on the likelihood of detection. The uncertainty that pervades the process – both as to the
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likelihood of a suit and its merits – undoubtedly provides an additional limitation on the
deterrent value of the litigation.269
Not only does the detection threat appear weak, but the probable penalty is also
too low to serve as an effective deterrent, a fact that is confirmed by the statistical study. Any
deterrent effect the suits might have should be evident in a loss of shareholder value; otherwise
the suits will likely be treated as a cost of doing business. One reason the damages are too low is
that current law caps the damages for an employment discrimination case filed under Title VII at
a maximum of $300,000 per plaintiff for large companies with lower caps for smaller
employers.270 Employment discrimination cases are one of the very few classes of federal cases
for which damages are capped and the caps have not been revised since they were first instituted
more than a decade ago. Intentional claims of race discrimination can avoid the damage caps if
they are filed under section 1981, though surprisingly few cases are brought pursuant to that
statute.271 In the class action area, this is partly due to the fact that most systemic discrimination
claims include allegations based on a disparate impact theory, a theory that cannot be pursued
under section 1981.272
By their nature, damages caps are arbitrary and have no necessary relation to the damage
a company’s discrimination is likely to cause either to the immediate victims or to society at
large and almost certainly pose an additional restriction on the law’s deterrent effect.273 As noted
earlier, at least for the companies studied in this article, the aggregate settlement amounts are
also too small to provide meaningful deterrence. We saw earlier that the $100 million settlement
with Home Depot amounted to two weeks of pretax profit, and the $54 settlement with Denny’s

269

See John E . Calfee & Richard Craswe ll, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance With Legal
Standards, 70 V A . L. R EV . 965 (19 84) (ana lyzing the impact o f uncertain ty on de terrence)..
270
See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (20 00).
271
See Micha el Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s Role in Employment
Discrimination Law, 57 O H I O S T . L.J. 1, 45 (1996).
272
See General Building Contractors Ass’n v. PA, 458 U.S. 375, 383 (1982).
273
See D A N D EWEES , D A V I D D UFF , M ICHAEL T REBILCOCK, E XPLAINING THE D OMAIN OF A CCIDENT L A W :
T AKING THE F ACTS S ERIOUSLY 194 (1996) (arguing that dam age caps imply underdettterence).
74

– a corporation that was on the brink of financial collapse – amounted to roughly 3% of its
annual revenue, equivalent to about 10 days of revenue.274
The existence of insurance further complicates the firm’s potential liability. Following
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, insurance carriers began to offer Employment
Practices Liability insurance (“EPLI”) to cover the costs of discrimination claims.275 While the
policy coverages vary, many include punitive damages, as well as all other forms of monetary
relief, and most large employers now carry the insurance.276 The effect insurance may have on
the law’s deterrence function is a subject of considerable speculation, and one that is not unique
to employment discrimination cases.277 Even though the presence of insurance may suppress
incentives to prevent discrimination, insurance carriers can play a preventive role through their
underwriting practices and the various incentives they provide to the insured.278 At the same
time, it seems that the combination of limited damages, a low probability of detection, and the
availability of insurance substantially mutes the litigation’s deterrent effects.
There are, of course, non-monetary sanctions that could also serve to deter
discrimination. In the discrimination area, it has long been assumed that the reprobation that
274
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accompanies a finding of liability would provide a strong deterrent, and in a related fashion,
society’s moral condemnation that might attend accusations of discrimination may also provide
additional incentives for managers to ensure that their practices conform to the requirements of
the law. This study, however, cautions against relying on these non-monetary sanctions – moral
condemnation seems to follow only explicit racial discrimination with less application to sex
stereotyping or subtle forms of race or sex discrimination. As demonstrated by the statistical
study in section two, unless the lawsuit involves overt claims of discrimination that can be
treated as racist in nature, a company that is sued for discrimination, or settles litigation, does not
appear to suffer any distinct reputational damage.279 In this respect, despite the various legal
developments regarding what constitutes discrimination, we remain steeped in a notion of
discrimination that is animus-based, a definition that excludes much of what the law would
define as discrimination.280 Although many mangers will sincerely declare a desire to do the
right thing, to use the colloquial phrase, their definition of what constitutes the right thing is
quite often narrowly drawn, leaving monetary sanctions as the primary deterring force, limited as
they may be.
3. Will the Market Drive Out Discrimination?
In addition to the deterrent value of the litigation, competitive market forces might also
work to eradicate systemic labor market discrimination. In one of the most influential law and
economic insights, Gary Becker posited that competitive labor markets should drive out
discriminatory firms because discrimination is an inefficient labor practice that would create
competitive disadvantages for the discriminating firms.281 Labor market discrimination involves
relying on characteristics that are unrelated to a firm’s productivity concerns, and thus, over
time, discriminatory firms would be priced out of the market by nondiscriminating firms that
279
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would have lower labor costs.282 Because labor costs themselves are often difficult for investors
to isolate,283 a class action lawsuit alleging employment discrimination should provide a strong
market signal that the firm is engaging in inefficient employment practices, the very kind of
information that investors or competitors could and should exploit.284 Moreover, given how
infrequent class action suits remain, the filing of a lawsuit should provide a particularly powerful
market signal.
And yet, as we saw through the statistical study, the lawsuits rarely have any significant
effect on stock prices, a fact that casts doubt on Becker’s strong hypothesis that the market will
eliminate discriminatory firms. Becker’s thesis, however, did not revolve around the filing of
lawsuits but rather focused on the costs of discrimination, and it may be that those costs are
reflected in lower stock prices even without the presence of a lawsuit. If this were the case, one
would expect stock prices to increase after a settlement because a settlement would send a signal
that the discriminatory practices that had depressed stock prices would be eliminated.285 The
data do not support this hypothesis with the exception of the two cases in which the settlement
positively impacted stock prices.286 As a result, the statistical study suggests there is no reason
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to believe that discriminatory firms will be driven from the market, or even that discriminatory
practices will be eliminated.
I have so far been concentrating on the way in which the statistical study is inconsistent
with Becker’s thesis, but there is another interpretation of Becker’s thesis that may find support
in the data and case studies. Becker’s thesis was originally premised on a definition of
discrimination that involves explicit intentional discrimination based on animus – whites not
wanting to hire African Americans because of their distaste or dislike for them.287 Today,
however, much of the existing labor market discrimination occurs in less overt forms, and
animus discrimination appears to account for only a small level of current labor market
discrimination, notwithstanding the contrary evidence found within the class actions discussed in
this study. Based on this evidence, as well as the reaction to the Texaco tapes and the overt
discriminatory policies of Denny’s, one might conclude that Becker’s thesis has largely proved
correct, at least with respect to animus-based discrimination much of which has been driven
from the market. When systemic animus-based discrimination does appear today, the reaction is
both strong and swift, as most evident in the sharp stock price decline Texaco suffered after the
tapes were first revealed.288 This is not to suggest that competitive market pressures were
responsible for driving out animus-based discrimination, as Becker predicted. Rather, it seems
more likely that our social norms regarding discrimination have substantially evolved and this
change in norms best explains the relative paucity of systemic animus-based discrimination, and
the societal reaction when it does appear.289 This may also explain why we do not see a similar
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reaction for the sex discrimination suits: our social norms have not been transformed to the same
extent and we remain strikingly ambivalent about women’s presence in the workplace.290
In contrast to Becker’s emphasis on the inefficiency of discrimination, others have
argued that some forms of discrimination may be efficient and would likely persist until a
lawsuit was filed to end the practice. For example, discrimination that is intended to satisfy
customer expectations or demand can be efficient so long as the gain in customer satisfaction
exceeds the loss due to inefficient labor practices.291 Under some circumstances, employees may
also prefer, and work better in, a homogenous workplace either because interests will more
likely be aligned or because some employees may gain status by having a workplace that is
structured along race or gender lines. Richard McAdams, for example, has suggested that white
workers gain status at the expense of black workers when black workers are assigned to the least
desirable jobs,292 and Richard Epstein has argued that homogeneous workforces are often more
productive than a diverse workforce.293
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The case studies provide some support for the notion that the firms’ discriminatory
practices may have been consistent with either customer or employee preferences. It is
conceivable, for example, that Home Depot structured its assignment system based on the
preferences of its customers, assuming that men, or even women, might prefer to receive advice
on the sales floor from men.294 The policies instituted by Denny’s and Shoney’s could also
plausibly be explained by customer preferences to the extent white customers may have
preferred not to eat with or be waited on by African Americans. That said, it is important to
emphasize that the corporations never justified their policies based on customer, or employee,
preference295 and there is no evidence to indicate that the policies were designed to satisfy those
preferences. At most, the policies appeared to be based on the presumed preferences of
customers, which were almost certainly consistent with the preferences of the owners who
instituted the discriminatory policies.296
C. Reforming the Process.
The picture I have been painting of class action discrimination may seem unduly
negative, but I want to emphasize that this is an instance where the evidence is clearly mixed.
Class action litigation has brought jobs and monetary relief to thousands of individuals, has
reformed practices and has likely ended or significantly altered discriminatory practices. These
are all socially desirable outcomes and by themselves may justify the costs of the current system.
Those costs, however, are not insubstantial, as measured by the limited benefits that actually
294
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accrue to class members, the emphasis on diversity programs and other reform efforts that
primarily serve public relations purposes rather than structural reform, the limited deterrent
effects of the lawsuits, the lack of any accountability and oversight, as well as the extraordinary
fees obtained by attorneys. Given all of the existing constraints, the current system may still be,
on balance, the best system we can reasonably expect, though I believe some reforms could
better align the system with its fundamental purposes while increasing its accountability. I will
concentrate on two important reforms: increasing the damages that are available in employment
discrimination lawsuits, and restoring the public accountability of the litigation.
1. Higher Damages Should be Available.
The current litigation regime fails to adequately deter discrimination, in part because the
damages are too low to make a significant difference to large firms and one possible reform
would be to substantially change the remedies that are available for employment discrimination.
This might be accomplished in three different ways. First, the damage caps might be raised,
perhaps from a maximum of $300,000 to $500,000, or some equivalent figure. Second, the
damage caps could be eliminated, and third, the statute could be altered so that it more closely
replicated the antitrust enforcement scheme in which treble damages are available.
At a minimum, the existing damage caps should be raised, if for no other reason than to
take account of inflation, which has substantially eroded the statute’s deterrent effect over the
last decade. By itself, however, this reform seems too limited, and would accomplish little more
than to return the statute to the force it held earlier in the decade, where it did not seem to serve
as an adequate deterrent for the reasons discussed earlier. The statute’s deterrence value would
be enhanced far more successfully if the damage caps were removed altogether. In this way,
defendants would be required to bear the full and actual costs of their discrimination, which has
always been seen as a critical feature of any system designed to deter misconduct.297 In addition
to removing the caps, there is a substantial argument that a serious commitment to deterring
297
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discrimination might require the availability of treble damages, such as are available for
successful antitrust prosecutions.298 Rather than adopting treble damages, one might borrow the
remedial scheme applicable in age discrimination cases, which provides for a doubling of the
back pay award for established wilful violations.299
A treble or double damage provision serves two purposes that are as applicable in the
employment discrimination context as they are for antitrust prosecutions. First, the provision
confers a stronger deterrent than would otherwise exist, and second, it helps attract attorneys
who will ultimately receive a portion of any successful prosecution. Antitrust cases are
notoriously complex and difficult to prosecute, and studies have found that the treble damage
provision has, in fact, increased prosecutions.300 Applying treble damages would surely have a
similar effect in the employment discrimination area, though as discussed below, that is not
necessarily reason alone to justify increasing the damage levels.
In addition to possibly enhancing the deterrence value, providing for treble damages
would also convey an important expressive message. There has recently been a renewed interest
among scholars in the expressive element of law, what are defined as the messages and the
values conveyed by our legal structure.301 Providing treble damages for employment
discrimination would send a message of moral outrage toward the persistence of discrimination
that as a society we often proclaim but fail to support with tangible policy initiatives. The
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existing damage caps provide a far more limited message by placing a price on discrimination –
a price that seems far too low either to deter most employers or to adequately compensate for the
social harm that results from persistent and pervasive discrimination. Nor do the current limits
convey an adequate societal condemnation of discrimination, but instead they suggest that
discrimination should be treated as a controllable cost of doing business, which, is what
discrimination has largely become.
Increasing the damages available for employment discrimination so as to increase the
deterrent value of antidiscrimination litigation is likely to be met with two immediate objections,
though they arise from apposite perspectives. Those who desire more deterrence may be
skeptical about the effect removing the caps or providing for treble damages might have, given
the limited influence even large damage awards currently have on firms. As evident in both the
Texaco and Home Depot cases, the settlement amounts were well below the theoretical outer
limits of their potential liability, as measured by the number of class members and the possible
damage awards, and it is far from clear that raising those outer limits will substantially deter a
greater amount of discrimination. Nevertheless, the prospect of greater damages should provide
some stronger incentive for a firm to prevent discrimination, though it is difficult to say how
much, and this is may be a sufficiently important social goal, one that merits altering the existing
damage regime.
A more forceful objection will arise from those who are skeptical about the need for
greater deterrence. There is, it seems, no existing societal consensus that discrimination remains
a prevalent feature of the labor market, and indeed, one of the most striking findings of this study
was the absence of any such concern in the media reports. For this study, I read hundreds of
newspaper and magazine articles, and outside of the sensational allegations involving overt race
and sex discrimination, no story suggested that the increase in litigation or the resulting massive
settlements were a sign that the firms were, in fact, engaging in discrimination. The stories
invariably discussed the cases in statistical terms and likewise described the settlements as
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business decisions that were not necessarily tied to a need for serious reform. No story
mentioned the fact that discriminatory business practices were inefficient and therefore harmful
to the underlying business, other than with the limited exceptions of the cases involving Denny’s
and Shoney’s, and to a lesser extent Texaco, which were seen as potentially discouraging
minority customers.302 While the lawsuits were not necessarily defined as frivolous, nor were
they seen as rooting out discriminatory practices. Instead the lawsuits were typically treated as
transfers of wealth, with the transfers to attorneys always playing a prominent role in the media
portrayals.303
These issues touch on a fundamental paradox raised by this study: although the existing
damage regime appears inadequate to deter discrimination, increasing the damages may increase
litigation without actually deterring additional discrimination. Ultimately, resolving this
conundrum through legislative reform will require considerably more information — and a
stronger societal consensus — regarding the persistence of discrimination than currently exists.
Nevertheless, there seems little reason to limit the damages available in discrimination suits, and
lifting the damage caps will at least require companies to concentrate on the actual cost of
discrimination rather than the artificial limits that are currently imposed.
2. Restoring Public Accountability to Class Action Litigation.
One of the most troubling aspects of this study is the lack of oversight for the class action
settlements involving employment discrimination. The cases discussed in this article were all
brought and developed by private parties -- as is true for the vast majority of class action
lawsuits filed in the last decade.304 As noted earlier, the government occasionally seeks to join a

302

See Calvin Sim s, Giving Denny’s a Menu for Change, N.Y. T IMES , Jan. 1, 1994, at A43 (noting that the
decline in tra ffic at Den nys’ restau rants was d ue in part to the lawsu its).
303
See, e.g., Stephan ie Arm our, Bias Suits Put Spotlight on Workplace Diversity: Critics Site Lucrative
Fees, Advoc ates Say Case s Bring Prog ress, USA T O D A Y , Jan. 10, 20 01, at 1B ; David S egal, Lawyers Stake
Claim on B ias Lawsuits: With M ore Cases in Litigation , Firms Cash in o n a Billable-Ho ur Bonan za, W ASH .
P OST , Jan. 27, 1997, at A1.
304
For example, of the 85 class action employment discrimination cases filed in 1998, the government
broug ht only o ne. See Adm inistrative O ffice of the C ourts, Judic ial Business of the Co urts 1998 , at Table
X-5.
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lawsuit, as it did in the Texaco and Shoneys’ litigations, but outside of the Mitsubishi case, the
government has not played a significant role in either the litigation or the subsequent monitoring
of any of the cases. But without a government presence, there appears to be no substantive
monitoring at all.
Diversity task forces have become one of the primary means of implementing and
enforcing settlement agreements, but these task forces provide little meaningful oversight. The
task forces rarely object to any of the company’s proposals or their reported progress. Rather, as
indicated in the Texaco discussion, the task forces quickly become an arm of the company,
amounting to little more than a public relations cheerleader that conveys a false picture of
independence and review.305 The lack of independence is likely due to the task force’s
dependence on the company for access to information and its fees, and although the task force
may provide its report to the court, the plaintiffs’ attorneys and any government agency that was
involved in the case, there appears to be no independent oversight of any kind by any of the
interested parties. Indeed, the task forces are designed to remove any obligation on the parties to
monitor the consent decree.
And like the diversity industry that the Task Forces resemble, the monitoring business is
fast becoming a lucrative enterprise for a small group of individuals, many of whom cycle
through the various corporate monitoring groups.306 The current task forces are comprised
substantially of former government officials from the Clinton and Bush administrations who
now make their living touting the accomplishments of former defendants.307 These high-profile
305

See supra text accompanying notes 115-19.
It is estimated that the members of the Texaco Task Force receive annual compensation of $75,000,
while the Chair rece ives $12 5,000. See Henry Unger, Judge Instructs Coke Task Force, A T L A N T A J. &
C ONST ., Aug. 22, 2001, at 3D (“[In the Texaco case] the head of the task force has been paid $125,000 a
year, while other members hav e received $75,000 each.”).
307
For example, Deval Patrick, the former head of the Civil Rights Division for the Department of Justice,
recently resigned his position as general counsel for Texaco, a stint he entered after having served as the
head of Texaco ’s Diversity Task Fo rce, to mo ve to Co ca-Cola w here he o versees the implem entation o f its
new diversity initiatives. Patrick was replaced on the Texaco Diversity Task Force by Thomas Williamson,
the former Labor Department Solicitor in the Clinton Administration and now a partner at a prominent
Washington Law Firm. Clinton’s former Labor Secretary, Alexis Herman, was named to oversee CocaCola’s D iversity Ta sk Force , a group that includ es two oth er form er Clinton Departm ent officials. See
Unge r, supra note 306 at 3D (noting that the former head of the EEOC and Assistant Attorney General for
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individuals provide unquestionably positive public relations for the companies but it is less clear
that they provide any meaningful oversight. Based on my research, there has not been a single
issue or objection raised by either a diversity task force or one of the plaintiff attorneys in any of
the litigation discussed earlier.308
The situation is considerably worse in those cases that do not implement diversity task
forces. In their litigation, the Saperstein law firm has not required the creation of diversity task
forces, and in fact, requires very little reporting from its defendants at all. During the four years
it was under a consent decree, Home Depot appears to have filed only one progress report, which
provided no data and which the plaintiffs’ attorneys summarily approved with the conclusory
statement that the numbers were better than before.309 Progress reports were filed under seal in
the Shoney’s case, and no information was ever made available in the State Farm litigation.
Despite the lack of public reporting, the earlier cases involving Shoney’s and State Farm did
result in meaningful reform, while the later cases brought by the firm, including all of the
grocery store cases, seem to have resulted in far less tangible, if any, benefits from revised
employment practices.310 This may have to do with the changes in the law that made damages
available, changes in personnel in the law firm, or other factors, but the change seems
unmistakable. Indeed, there is some danger that employment discrimination class actions are
becoming more like the much maligned consumer class actions – coupons have already been
used as part of a settlement involving Winn-Dixie,311 stock options covered some of the damages
in Coca-Cola, and in the last few years attorneys who had previously specialized in personal

Civil Righ ts were on the Task Force). L ynn M artin, labor se cretary in th e first Bush A dministra tion,
played a prom inent role in Mitsubish i’s reform efforts.
308
The exception is Mitsubishi, where the Task force made a number of suggestions to the company and
seemed far less an arm of the com pany th an has be en the case for the Te xaco T ask Forc e. See Final Report
to the Parties and the C ourt, EE OC v. M itsubishi M otor M anuf. (on file with the a uthor).
309
See text accompany note 149 supra.
310
See Stuart Silve rstein, In Supe rmarke ts’ Execu tive Depa rtment, A Lack of V ariety, L.A. T IMES , May 2,
1999, a t C1 (ana lyzing the lack of w omen or mino rities at man agem ent levels in su perma rket indu stry).
311
See Mark A lbright, Judge to Review Winn-Dixie Suit Deal, S T . P E T E R SB U R G T IMES , July 27, 1999, at 1E
(“A substantial slice of Winn-Dixie’s settlement, $6.2 million, will be paid not in cash but in coupons
offering 10 percent discounts on goods at Winn-Dixie stores.”)
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injury litigation and securities fraud have gravitated towards employment discrimination
cases.312
The current situation marks a dramatic change from the past when class action
employment discrimination litigation was thought to represent one of the hallmarks of public
law litigation brought by cause lawyers who were primarily interested in pursuing justice rather
than profit.313 The recent cases reject this model in favor of a purely private dispute resolution
system that is principally about money. In other words, discrimination claims are now just
another form of tort where the principle objective is to recover money rather than to reform the
corporation through ongoing monitoring. This is perhaps most evident in the case against Home
Depot where the company steadfastly refused to provide meaningful information to the public
and the plaintiffs’ attorneys moved to vacate the decree earlier even though Home Depot had not
met the goals it had established for itself. Similarly, recall that in the Texaco case, none of the
primary beneficiaries (women and suppliers) of Texaco’s reform initiatives were parties to the
lawsuit. African Americans, including African-American suppliers, have gained little from the
Texaco litigation other than the initial substantial monetary recoveries.314
An important reason the cases do not produce more change is that they lack any public
accountability, which contradicts the original and continuing purposes of class action litigation.
With one exception, which proved to be temporary, judges have routinely signed off on the
312

As noted earlier, som e of the attorneys w ho broug ht the Texaco case made th eir name in co nsumer class
actions, an d attorney s who p reviously specialized in person al injury an d securities fra ud hav e recently
becom e involve d in discrim ination class actions. See Betsy M cKay, Aggres sive Law yer Joins R ace Law suit
Agains t Coca-C ola, W ALL S T . J., April 17, 2000, at B34 (noting that plaintiffs’ attorney Will Gary who
“doesn ’t generally handle e mploy ment d iscrimina tion cases” had joine d the law suit); Jess Brav in, Lawyers
Noted fo r Investor C lass Action s Ally With E mploym ent and Bias Spe cialists, W ALL S T . J., Oct. 13, 2000, at
B6 (“Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes and Lerach a law firm best known for its securities class action
practice, is pushing into the growth area of employment law . . . in bringing discrimination suits.”). Not
everyo ne sees the turn to per sonal injur y lawye rs as a nega tive deve lopme nt. See Anne B loom, Taking on
Goliath: Why Personal Injury Litigation May Represent the Future of Transnational Cause Lawyering, in
C AUSE L AWYERING AND TH E S T A T E IN A G LOBAL E RA 110, 115 (A. Sarat & S. Sheingold eds. 2001)
(suggesting that personal injury attorneys may have much to offer because of their resources and risk-taking
orientation ).
313
See, e.g., J OEL F. H ANDLER , S OCIAL M OVEMENTS AND THE L EGAL S YSTEM : A T HEORY OF L A W R EFORM
A N D S OCIAL C H A N G E 140-49 (1978) (describing law reform efforts through employment discrimination
litigation) and sources cited in note 6 supra.
314
See text accom panyin g notes 1 12-14 , supra.
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settlement agreements proposed by the parties without engaging in any serious inquiry, and
typically no independent judicial decision is produced at the time the settlements are approved.315
Increasingly courts are appointing mediators to fashion settlements, as occurred in a number of
high profile cases including the Home Depot litigation, which diminishes the likelihood that a
court will conduct meaningful review to the extent the mediator is seen as acting on behalf of the
court. Perhaps an ideal enforcement system would combine high damage awards to plaintiffs
with a financial incentive to attorneys that was sufficient to attract competent counsel without
luring those whose interests were primarily financial in nature. This may, however, be an
impossible equilibrium to create, but there are clearly some reforms that could restore public
accountability to the process sand thereby ensure that antidiscrimination litigation serves the
goal of preventing and remedying discrimination.
First, rather than establishing Diversity Task Forces that report directly to the company,
a court should appoint an independent monitor to oversee implementation of the consent decree.
This is the model that had previously been used for discrimination suits and was successfully
employed in the Mitsubishi litigation, which relied on a court-appointed three-person task force
that effectively reviewed the company’s employment practices.316 In this schema, the monitor is
seen as an arm of the court rather than an arm of the company, and is far more likely to engage
in independent assessment than a group that has been appointed, and is directly compensated, by
the company itself. The court might also establish an independent monitor, or perhaps a
magistrate, to provide a serious review of the terms of the settlement, although the rules of civil
procedure already provide the court with such responsibility and it is not clear how much will be
gained by asking someone else to do the court’s job.317 For a variety of reasons, a court is in a
315

See supra note 28.
See supra note 26 1.
317
Judith Resnik ha s suggested that a co urt-appointed m onitor migh t be required to be p resent during class
action settlement negotiations, in large part to ensure that attorney’s fees are not discussed until after
settlemen t on the claim is reached . See Judith Re snik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions
Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. P A . L.
R EV . 2119, 2 181 (20 00). Ch arles Silver a nd Ly nn Bak er conten d that attorn eys repre senting a c lass should
be treated as a trustee or a guardian, but acknowledge that they do not always perform their tasks consistent
with their fid uciary du ties. See Charles S ilver and L ynn Ba ker, I Cut, You Ch oose: The R ole of Plaintiffs’
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distinctly inferior position to actively oversee the implementation of the agreement,318 and an
independent monitor or trustee may provide some reasonable certainty that the goals of the
decree will actually be sought and possibly attained. The Monitor should be paid on an hourly
basis by a fee determined by the court so as to provide an adequate incentive for the monitor to
oversee the process and for the defendants to provide meaningful and expeditious reform.
Similar suggestions have been made to curb the abuses seen in other forms of class actions,
particularly mass torts,319 which again highlights the evolution of employment discrimination
class action from civil rights claims with public overtones to private tort-like litigation.
Additionally, a court should not permit settlements that provide for attorneys fees out of a
common settlement fund, nor should the court allow the parties to negotiate a fee at the time they
negotiate the settlement for the class members.320 Fee negotiations should not be conducted until
after the class settlement is obtained, and the monetary amounts for the claim fund and
attorney’s fees should always be kept separate and distinct. 321 Allowing the attorneys to petition
a court for a part of the settlement fund, as was done in the Texaco case, places the attorneys in
Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 V A . L. R EV . 1465, 1 509 (19 98).
Given their docket pressures and their lack of access to the information the attorneys have compiled,
courts are unlikely to fail to appro ve a settlem ent absen t clear evide nce of ab use, and a re even le ss likely to
becom e involve d in the im plemen tation of the agreem ent. See Christop her R. Le slie, A Market-Based
Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. R EV . 991,
1053 (2002) (“For a variety of systemic and case-specific reasons, courts are loathe to reject proposed
settlemen ts in class action litigation.”); Silv er and B aker, supra note –, at 1 515 (no ting that co urts typically
require clear abuse before they reject a settlement). Courts appear even more reluctant to disrupt
settlemen ts in discrim ination cas es becau se, unlike o ther class actio n attorney s, the plaintiff atto rneys in
discrimin ation claim s have the air of prote cting the p ublic intere st, and thus there has b een little occa sion to
challeng e their judg ment.
319
On calls fo r increased monito ring of clas s action settlem ents see Ric hard N agareda , Turning from Tort
to Administration, 94 M ICH . L. R EV . 899, 948-52 (1996) (calling for hard look review of settlements);
Debo rah R. H ensler & Thom as D. Ro we, Jr., Beyond “It Just Ain’t Worth It”: Alternative Strategies for
Dama ge Class Action R eform, 64 L A W & C O N T . P ROBS . 137, 148-52 (2001) (arguing for more rigorous
review o f settlemen ts); John C . Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 M D . L. R EV . 215, 248 (1983) (calling for institutionalizing a
monitoring role at the settlement stage).
320
The role of attorney s’ fees in class a ction litigation is widely re cognize d as both critically imp ortant to
ensuring adequa te represen tation and deeply tro ubling. F or a recen t discussion of prop osals to reg ulate
attorneys ’ fees see Sa muel Issa charoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 S .C T .
R V W . 337, 38 6-89.
321
At one tim e, this was th e rule of the Third C ircuit. See Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015,
1017 (3 rd Cir. 1977), a decision that was implicitly overturned by the Supreme Court decision in Evans v.
Jeff D., 47 5 U.S. 71 7, 765 (1 986). See Ashley v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 794 F.2d 128, 137-38 (3 rd Cir.
1986) . For a discu ssion of the rule and th e pertinen t cases see R esnik, supra note 31 7, at 2179 -81.
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an adversarial position to their clients without any interested party available to defend the
client’s interests. Even better, but far less practical, the question of attorneys’ fees would not be
negotiated until after the settlement was approved. A defendant, however, is unlikely to agree to
such an approach because it does not provide the finality a defendant typically seeks through the
settling of a class action claim.322
An alternative method of compensating the attorneys would be for courts to return to the
lode-star approach that governs most individual claims of employment discrimination. Under a
lodestar approach, an attorney is compensated for the actual time she devotes to a case based on
a reasonable hourly rate.323 Applying a lodestar approach would almost certainly depress the
supply of profit-motivated attorneys but in doing so it would likely leave too few attorneys
available to bring the class action cases, particularly considering the low filing levels that still
prevail despite the tremendous increase in damages and publicity the class action cases have
received in the last few years. The lodestar approach also brings its own set of undesirable
incentives, including divorcing the attorney from the value of the settlement and an increased
emphasis on overlitigating cases. These limitations have caused courts to abandon the lodestar
approach in other class action areas,324 and there is no reason to believe the approach would
prove substantially more successful for employment discrimination claims. Instead, courts
should carefully scrutinize fee claims, and rely on the lodestar method as a check on the
reasonableness of the fee request.325
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My own experience negotiating class action settlements is that defendants typically care far less about
who g ets the mo ney than they do about h ow m uch m oney th ey have to pay ou t.
323
For a recent discussion and comparison of the lodestar method with the percentage of recovery method
see Jill E. Fisch , Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102
C O L U M . L. R EV . 650, 65 7-59 (2 001).
324
See Samu el Issacharo ff, Class Ac tion Con flicts, 30 U.C. D AVIS L. R EV . 05, 827 (1997) (“Basically , all
courts ex cept the Flo rida Sup reme C ourt . . . have abando ned the fa iled lodestar experim ent.”). The statute
aimed at curbing some of the abuses of securities litigation requires that attorneys be paid from a common
settlement fund. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6) (200 0).
325
This is increasingly the practice in securities litigation, where the statute restricts attorneys to a
percenta ge of the r ecovery . See Fisch, supra note 323, at 661 (“Courts are increasingly evaluating the
reasonableness of their fee calculations by sing the percentage of recovery method and then cross-checking
their results w ith the lode star meth od.”).
90

It is important to emphasize that none of the attorneys involved in the cases discussed
previously appeared to engage in collusive activity or put their own interests ahead of their
clients. Rather, what is troubling, is the lack of public accountability and the seeming lack of
real progress on the terms of the decrees, despite what the parties often represent to the court and
the public. It is worth noting here that the courts have never played a substantial role in
employment discrimination settlements. With few exceptions, fairness hearings have always
been designed to create a record rather than to determine the actual fairness of an agreement, and
indeed, they are rarely eventful or even attended by dissident class members.326 Yet, when
employment discrimination cases were treated as involving public rather than purely private
interests, particularly when the cases were brought by non-profit civil rights organizations or the
government, the filing of the settlement agreement often marked the beginning of the
proceedings rather than the end, as these attorneys carefully reviewed the defendants’ progress to
ensure that the terms of the agreement were being fulfilled. Contempt proceedings, or less
formal objections, were common, and the fruit of this litigation was often changing an
employer’s employment practices and securing jobs or promotions for class members rather than
the size of the settlement fund. Today the success of the private class action litigation is
measured solely by the size of the monetary pie with little attention devoted to securing actual
reform. Perhaps this is a worthy tradeoff, and it is certainly what is to be expected from profitmotivated attorneys who have an interest in securing a return on their investment. Unless there
is money to be earned from the monitoring of the settlement agreement, we should not expect
profit-motivated attorneys to engage in substantial active monitoring, particularly when the
lawyers are paid in advance for their monitoring activity, as was done in the Home Depot
litigation.327

326

Some of the rece nt cases ha ve draw n objecto rs, but the co urt has inv ariably ov erruled th e objection s.
See Ingram v. Coca-Co la, 200 F.R.D. 685, 691 (N.D. G a. 2001) (overruling objections).
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See text accom panyin g note 1 37, supra.
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One additional reform that might help restore public accountability to the process would
be to craft a role for the government in monitoring class action settlements. For example, the
EEOC might be appointed by a court, or through intervention, to oversee the implementation of
consent decrees and afforded a right to challenge a corporation’s actions or failure to meet the
terms of the decree. Alternatively, a non-profit agency such as the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
could be appointed to serve this role as an active monitor without any financial interests tied to
the litigation. This initiative could be funded by proceeds from the settlement, and would be one
way of providing an independent and disinterested voice to ensure that the terms of the
settlement agreement were fulfilled.328 In this respect, the government or a non-profit agency
would simply replace the private diversity task force as the overseer of the settlements. Even if
the EEOC were not afforded a role in the formation of the settlement, its role in the enforcement
of the decree may encourage the parties to work toward an acceptable and stronger agreement.
V. CONCLUSION
This study has sought to measure the effect of class action employment discrimination
lawsuits on firms and plaintiffs by conducting a statistical study and developing three particular
case studies. The statistical study demonstrates that shareholder value is not typically affected
by either the filing or the settlement of the lawsuits, and this finding holds true regardless of the
nature of the lawsuit or the size of the settlement. This finding also suggests that there is no
significant penalty for either engaging or being accused of discrimination, and if we want to
provide a stronger form of deterrence, it will be necessary to make higher damage awards
available for employment discrimination suits. The case studies highlight additional limitations
of seeking to further changes through litigation. In many cases, it appears that employment
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In a differe nt contex t, Alon K lement h as recently made th e intriguing suggestio n that mo nitors shou ld
be afford ed a finan cial stake in th e outcom e of the cas e. See Alon K lement, Who Should Guard the
Guardian s? A New A pproach fo r Monitoring C lass Action Law yers, 21 REV . L ITIG . 25 (2002). The
difficulty with this suggestion, particularly in the employment discrimination setting where monetary relief
should only be one aspect of the remedy provided, is that it would likely replicate the existing problems by
adding what w ould, in eff ect, be ano ther attorne y to divid e the settlem ent fund .
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discrimination litigation has become a private affair that is largely about money and public
relations, and rarely concerns itself with implementing broad institutional reform. It also seems
that it is only those cases that include sensational allegations, generally involving racial epithets
or blatant discrimination, that can capture the national attention, and under these circumstances,
it is possible that a company, such as Denny’s will seek to transform itself, but these instances
are infrequent, as is the prospect of corporate reform arising from private class action litigation .
All of this suggests that neither the harm nor the benefits of the private class action litigation is
substantial. Instead the cases are primarily about transfers of wealth, transfers that often are
channeled to entities other than the parties to the suit, but transfers that are too inconsequential to
affect corporate balance sheets.

The reforms suggested here, increasing damages while also imposing a monitoring
function over the settlements, are limited in nature and would offer modest improvements
without the prospect of transforming the litigation regime. This study’s primary value is
descriptive in nature, and suggests that we may want to reconsider our underlying assumptions
about class action discrimination litigation. Most importantly, we should not rely on the
litigation to eliminate or deter discrimination but instead should see it in a more limited light, as
a process of wealth transfers with a substantial public relations dimension that, on occasion, can
lead to substantial change to the extent a firm finds it in its interests to reform its employment
practices. In this respect, the litigation has become just another form of tort, which reflects our
declining national commitment to eradicate discrimination – discrimination that based on this
study remains a significant presence in the labor market.
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TABLE ONE
CLASS ACTION FILINGS, Nov. 1991-Aug. 2001

Dummy

Standard

0.0218

0.0175

Class Action Variable
Cumulative
Error of
Filings
Coefficient Coefficient t Statistic P_value Prediction Error
1

AA

1.2435

0.2154

0.0435

2

ABS

0.0383

0.0138

2.7761

0.0061

0.0766

3

ABS_92

_0.0041

0.0760

_0.0541

0.9569

_0.0082

4

C_FEB97

0.0161

0.0435

0.3702

0.7117

0.0322

5

CBS_V IA

_0.0316

0.0177

_1.7825

0.0765

_0.0632

6

CC_INITIAL

_0.0156

0.0162

_0.9668

0.3351

_0.0313

7

DAL

_0.0094

0.0164

_0.5752

0.5660

_0.0188

8

F_JUN93

_0.0022

0.0113

_0.1954

0.8453

_0.0044

9

FTU

_0.0064

0.0073

_0.8811

0.3795

_0.0129

10

GE_FEB97

0.0028

0.0065

0.4298

0.6679

0.0056

11

GPE

0.0075

0.0183

0.4130

0.6802

0.0151

12

HD

_0.0062

0.0430

_0.1439

0.8858

_0.0124

13

IBC_APR00

0.0239

0.0211

1.1343

0.2583

0.0478

14

KO_APR99

_0.0114

0.0119

_0.9524

0.3423

_0.0227

15

KO_JUN00

0.0226

0.0191

1.1849

0.2377

0.0452

16

LMT_RACE

0.0024

0.0217

0.1111

0.9117

0.0048

17

JWN_APR92

_0.0007

0.0184

_0.0383

0.9695

_0.0014

18

MCDONNELL

_0.0075

0.0130

_0.5771

0.5646

_0.0150

19

MET

_0.0321

0.0186

_1.7298

0.0855

_0.0643

20

MLM_M AY94

_0.0210

0.0144

_1.4636

0.1452

_0.0420

21

MRK_JAN99

_0.0028

0.0105

_0.2656

0.7909

_0.0056

22

MS_JAN97

0.0423

0.0318

1.3312

0.1850

0.0847

23

MSFT_JAN01

0.0356

0.0209

1.7034

0.0904

0.0713

24

MSFT_OCT00

_0.0145

0.0204

_0.7080

0.4800

_0.0289

25

PEP_SEP94

0.0014

0.0104

0.1312

0.8958

0.0027

26

POM

_0.0007

0.0067

_0.1026

0.9184

_0.0014

27

TX_MAR94

0.0004

0.0063

0.0632

0.9497

0.0008

28

TX_MAR00

_0.0165

0.0153

_1.0754

0.2838

_0.0329

29

TX_FEB97

0.0060

0.0098

0.6168

0.5382

0.0121

30

UA

0.0018

0.0177

0.1012

0.9195

0.0036

31

WEN_APR94

_0.0039

0.0087

_0.4449

0.6570

_0.0077

32

WM T

0.0076

0.0136

0.5567

0.5785

0.0152

33

XRX

0.0035

0.0484

0.0724

0.9423

0.0070

Cases in bold are
significant at
10%.

Cumulative
Average Prediction
Error (CAP E) =

CAPE test statistic =
0.0029

SUM(t_Stat)/sqrt(N)
94

0.1125

TABLE TWO
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS
November 1991 to August 2001

Class
Cumulative
Standard
Dummy
Action
Prediction Error
Error of
Variable
Settlements Coefficient Coefficient t Statistic P_value (CPE)
1

AB

_0.0178

0.0345

_0.5155

0.6069

_0.0356

2

ABS_92

_0.0028

0.0112

_0.2476

0.8048

_0.0056

3

ASC

0.0150

0.0096

1.5522

0.1225

0.0299

4

AXP_AUG92

_0.0012

0.0179

_0.0691

0.9450

_0.0025

5

ALD_NOV99

_0.0018

0.0096

_0.1893

0.8501

_0.0036

6

BA_DOL

0.0109

0.0141

0.7745

0.4397

0.0218

7

BA_JAN99

0.0167

0.0186

0.8996

0.3696

0.0335

8

CBS_VIA

_0.0047

0.0208

_0.2243

0.8228

_0.0093

9

CHV_NOV96

0.0023

0.0076

0.3085

0.7581

0.0047

10

EIX_OCT96

_0.0036

0.0087

_0.4185

0.6761

_0.0073

11

FTU

0.0063

0.0078

0.8114

0.4183

0.0127

12

HD

_0.0046

0.0085

_0.5365

0.5923

_0.0091

13

IBC

_0.0193

0.0222

_0.8699

0.3856

_0.0387

14

KO

0.0100

0.0165

0.6057

0.5456

0.0200

15

LMT_AGE

_0.0011

0.0082

_0.1378

0.8906

_0.0023

16

MER_FEB00

_0.0141

0.0189

_0.7434

0.4583

_0.0281

17

MER_MAY 98

_0.0035

0.0152

_0.2295

0.8188

_0.0070

18

MWD

0.0346

0.0195

1.7732

0.0780

0.0691

19

MD_J JUL 98

_0.0016

0.0143

_0.1118

0.9111

_0.0032

20

NSC

_0.0105

0.0181

_0.5813

0.5618

_0.0210

21

PZL_NOV98

_0.0057

0.0161

_0.3515

0.7257

_0.0113

22

SHOY

_0.0236

0.0186

_1.2689

0.2063

_0.0472

23

SW Y

0.0004

0.0147

0.0250

0.9801

0.0007

24

TX_NOV96

_0.0219

0.0083

_2.6448

0.0090

_0.0439

25

WIN_JUL99

0.0214

0.0111

1.9310

0.0552

0.0428

WXS_FEB95

0.0071

0.0108

0.6511

0.5159

0.0141

_0.0010

CAPE test statistic =
SUM(t_Stat)/sqrt(N)
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Cases in bold
are significant at
10%.

Cumulative
Average
Prediction Error
(CAPE) =

95

0.037767
4

Table Three
Size of Judgment as Percentage
of Firm Capitalization
Company Name
American Stores
First Union
Home Depot
Interstate Bakeries

Settle. Am t.
(millions)
$107.00
$58.50
$104.00
$28.30

Coca-C ola
Lockh eed M artin
Sho ney's

$192.50
$183.00
$134.00

Firm Ca pital.
(millions)
$3,077.73
$25,536.99
$11,478.85
$1,066.50
$140,643.07
$8,610.78
$903.37
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Percent.
3.48%
0.23%
0.91%
2.65%
0.14%
2.13%
14.83%

TABLE FOUR
TEXACO PROGRESS SINCE SETTLEMENT
Category
Minority Workers
Female Worke rs
Minority & Female Execs
Minority Ex ecs.
New Minority Hires
New Female Hires
Minority Promotions
Female Promotions

1997
20.3
26.7
15.0
8.5
na
na
24.9
43.6
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1998
21.1
26.0
18.9
10.4
37.7
40.4
21.4
38.7

1999
22.4
26.6
20.0
10.5
44.4
49.4
28.8
57.6

2000
23.2
27.2
19.8
10.1
33.4
40.6
24.9
39.4

Table Five
Coca-Cola Settlement
Item
Compensatory Damages
Back Pay Fund
Promotional Achieve. Fund
Salary E quity A djustme nts
Diversity Initiatives
Attorney's Fees
Total
Source: Ingraham v. Coca-Cola
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Amt.
(mil)
$58.7
$23.7
$10.0
$43.5
$36.0
$20.6
$192.5

Table Six
Class Action Settlement Distributions
Case
Texaco
Shoney’s
Coca-C ola
Home Depot
Publix
Lucky Stores
Edison Int’l
Boeing

Amou nt for class Ave. A mt.
(millions)
$117.10
$63,000
105.00
4,850
83.00
38,000
65.00
9,683
63.00
840
60.50
5,000
11.25
4,700
7.30
14,280

Atty’s Fees
(millions)
$20.1 (14.6%)
$29.0 (21.6%)
$20.7 (29.0%)
$22.5 (25.7%)
$18.0 (22.2%)
$13.8 (18.6%)
7.0 (38.4%)
$4.0 (35.4%)

Source: Public sources, newspapers, court opinions.
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APPENDIX ONE
CLASS ACTION DEFENDANTS
Company Name
American Airlines (AA)
Albertson's (ABS)
Albertson's (ABS)
Citibank (C)
CBS-Viacom (CBS-VIA)
Circuit City (CC)
Delta Airlines (DAL)
Ford (F)
First Union (FTU)
General Electric (GE)
Georgia Power Co. (GPE)
Home Depot (HD)
Interstate Bakeries (IBC)
Coca-Cola (KO)
Coca-Cola (KO)
Lockheed Martin (LMT)
Nordstrom (JWN)
Boeing (MD)
MetLife (MET)
M artin -M arietta (M LM )
Merck & Co. (MRK)
Morgan Stanley (MS)
Microsoft (MSFT)
Microsoft (MSFT)
Pizza Hut (Pep)
P o to m ac E lectric (PO M )
Texaco (TX)
Texaco (TX)
Texaco (TX)
United Airlines (UA)
Wendy's (WEN)
Walmart (WMT)
Xerox (XRX)

Type o f Suit
Sex
Race
Sex/N.O.
Race
Sex
Race
Race
Race
Race/Age
Age
Race
Sex
Race
Race
Race
Race
Race
Sex
Sex
Age
Race
Race
Race
Race/Sex
N.O.
Race
Race
Race
Race
Sex
Race
Sex
Race
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Date
04/23/01
04/25/01
05/28/92
02/19/97
02/28/00
10/31/95
01/01/01
06/10/93
05/13/94
02/20/97
07/28/00
12/20/94
04/19/00
04/23/00
06/15/00
05/10/00
04/22/92
01/08/98
03/04/01
05/31/94
01/29/99
01/13/97
01/03/01
10/05/00
09/27/94
11/30/92
03/23/94
03/10/00
02/05/97
05/18/99
04/15/94
06/19/01
05/09/01

APPENDIX TWO
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS
Company Name

Type o f Suit Date

Astra (AB)
Sex
Albertsons (ABS)
Sex/N.O.
American Exp. (AXP)
Age
Allied Signal (ALD)
Age
Boeing (BA)
Race
CBS
Sex
Chevron (CHV)
Sex
Edison Intl. (EIX)
Race
First Union (FTU)
Age
Home Depot (HD)
Sex
Interstate Bakeries (IBC)
Race
Coca-Cola (KO)
Lockheed (LMT)
Merrill Lynch (MER)
Merrill Lynch (MER)
Boeing (MD)
Norfolk Southern (NSC)
Penzoil (PZL)
Shoneys (SHOY)
Safeway (SWY)
Winn-Dixie (WIN)
West Pt. Stevens (WXS)
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Race
Age
Sex
Sex
Race
Race
Race
Race
Sex
Race/Sex
Race

Amo unt
(millions)
02/05/98
$10.00
11/23/93
$29.50
08/28/92
$35.00
11/11/99
$8.00
01/22/99
$15.00
10/26/00
$8.00
11/07/96
$7.40
10/02/96
$11.30
10/23/97
$58.50
09/19/97 $104.00
08/01/00 $120.00
08/03/00
11/16/00 $192.00
04/14/97 $183.00
02/01/00
$20.00
06/05/00
$0.00
07/08/98
$28.00
01/10/01
$28.00
11/12/98
$6.75
01/28/93 $134.00
04/01/94
$7.50
04/01/94
$33.00
7/19/99
$20.00

APPENDIX THREE
EVENT STUDY EQUATIONS

First, the return (R) of the stock is calculated for the event period by using the
following equation
(1) Rkt = (Pkt/Pkt-1)-1
where Rkt = daily rate of return for firm k at time t
Pkt = daily closing stock price of firm k at time t
Second, the return of the stock is measured against the expected return based on
the aggregate market indicator, as indicated in the following equation:
(2) Rkt = "k + $kDt + $kMKTt + ,kt
Rkt = daily rate of return for firm k at time t
"k = constant term
MKTt = daily rate of return for market portfolio at time t
Dt = event dummy variable, equals 1 during event period, 0 otherwise
,kt = error term for daily rate of return for firm k at time t
Third, a cumulative predicton error (CPE) is calculated to take into account the
multiple-day event period:
(3) CPEk = $k*L
$k = coefficient of D, dummy variable, for firm k
L = number of days in event period.
Fourth, a cumulative average prediction error (CAPE) is calculated, which
averages the CPEs of the individual stocks
(4) CAPE = 3 CPEk//n
CPEk = CPE for firm k
n = number of firms within category (ie. filings or settlements)
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